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This thesis explores populist tendencies in political representatives from the Sweden 
Democrats (SD) in a Swedish city. Through ethnographic data and drawing on Ernesto 
Laclau’s theory on populist reason, I show how the SD constructs itself as “the people”, as 
opposed to “elites”, through chains of equivalences. United in having their demands denied by 
“elites”, my interlocutors were able to incorporate widely different demands into the party’s 
ideological composition. An internal, antagonistic frontier was established between “the 
people” and “elites” in the struggle over such demands. I argue that my interlocutors’ mistrust 
of “elites” – mainstream media, political representatives from other parties, as well as state and 
municipal institutions – made this antagonism between “the elites” and “the people” manifest. 
By examining my interlocutors’ ideas about “Swedishness” and national belonging, I also show 
that “the nation” – a key term in the SD’s political discourse, and which I analyse as an “empty 
signifier” – was crucial in shaping, and in turn being shaped by, the SD’s worldview. More or 
less every demand my interlocutors put forward was in some way centred around “the nation” 
and its protection, which in turn shaped subsequent demands. Finally, I argue that a neoliberal 
logic was also present in shaping my interlocutors’ worldviews: welfare chauvinism, while 
nationalist in my interlocutors’ rhetoric, was also, I suggest, underpinned by neoliberal ideas 
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Introduction – method and ethics  
 
These introductory pages will outline the methodological and ethical challenges I encountered 
during the production of this thesis, both in fieldwork and in writing. I will present the process 
which led to my fieldwork, how it was conducted, and how I reasoned when challenges arose, 
for example the 2020 covid-19 pandemic and thorny issues of positionality and complicity. 
Furthermore, I will discuss the difficulties in conducting fieldwork among, and writing about, 




Motivation and gaining access  
My choices of ethnographic field and research questions were born out of a long-standing 
curiosity on my part. Having grown up in Sweden, I watched the gradual rise of the Sweden 
Democrats (henceforth “the SD”) over the last two decades in somewhat fearful fascination. 
My friends and family spoke about them with revulsion; “we have Nazis in Parliament now”, 
“they’re fascists!”, they would say, faces drawn with disgust. I am sure I said similar things on 
occasion, myself. But I grew increasingly curious over the years. I would watch SD volunteers 
in their campaign tents in the street, scared to go up for fear of being associated with them, but 
incredulously wondering how they could believe what they believed. It went against everything 
I had learned and believed in. I did not know a single SD sympathiser personally (at least no-
one who said it out loud) and websites and party manifests did little to satisfy my curiosity. As 
my education in social anthropology progressed and I fell deeper in love with the discipline, I 
knew that the anthropological method of participant observation offered a chance to finally 
gain a better understanding of the SD’s worldview. When the opportunity to conduct fieldwork 
presented itself as part of an M.A degree, I jumped at the chance. 
 I began by contacting Benjamin Teitelbaum from the University of Colorado, a 
Swedish-American ethnographer who has worked with the nationalist milieu in Sweden 
(2017). Following a phone call where we discussed my project, he sent an e-mail to Mattias 
Karlsson, at the time group leader for the SD in Parliament, with whom Teitelbaum had 
worked. Karlsson put me into contact with Annika, the chairman of Centreville’s SD office. I 
e-mailed Annika and explained my proposed project. She agreed to let me shadow her and 
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anyone else who agreed to it. When the time came in January 2020, I moved to Centreville 
with my fiancé and I met Annika at the SD’s party office. She acted as my gatekeeper and 
contact person and graciously introduced me to my other key interlocutors.  
 The overwhelming majority of the people I met during fieldwork were curious, open, 
forthcoming, and happy to share their thoughts and time with me. At first I was a little surprised 
at this. I had, perhaps prejudiced, expected to be met with some suspicion and a reluctance to 
engage with me. But this was not my experience at all. Occasionally, I was asked to leave the 
room if there was a particular, personal or confidential, matter my interlocutors wanted to 
discuss, but generally, I was free to observe and join them in their day-to-day professional 
activities.  
 I cannot be sure whether this forthcoming attitude was orchestrated and pushed by the 
local party leadership in an effort to influence my data in a positive direction, but in private 
conversations with my interlocutors I never got the impression that they had a pre-planned 
coordinated approach to my presence. Of course, they were eager to present themselves and 
the party in as flattering a light as possible, but I always felt that they genuinely believed in 
what they were saying and that I was indeed welcome. Below, I elaborate on the topic of 
impression management and participant observation.  
 
(Participant) observation  
Following established social anthropological praxis, I employed participant observation as my 
main research method. I spent time with my interlocutors in their professional activities; mostly 
in the City Hall and the party office, as well as more informal settings such as lunches and 
dinners. In addition to everyday conversation in such informal settings, I also made use of 
unstructured interviews, asking them questions about what they were doing and why, and what 
they thought about different topics.  
 Of course, as H. Russell Bernard (2017) points out, participant observation inevitably 
entails a certain amount of impression management. My key interlocutors were all used to 
dealing with journalists and critics and had experience in presenting themselves in the best 
possible light. There is, of course, the possibility that this may have skewed my data. However, 
the strength of participant observation over a longer period of time is that the researcher gets 
the opportunity to study their interlocutors in a variety of situations, as well as, hopefully, 
gaining their trust. As Bernard, again, notes: “Presence builds trust. Trust lowers reactivity [the 
fact that people change their behaviour as a result of the researcher’s presence]. Lower 
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reactivity means higher validity of data” (2017, 282). I cannot be certain whether my 
interlocutors really trusted me, however. They often joked about how my thesis would paint 
them as racists, or that I was a member of AFA (Anti-Fascist Action). I would laugh along with 
them, and reassure them that I was not; that it would be both scholarly unacceptable and 
unethical to conduct research in that manner. I once overheard Gunilla telling Annika in the 
hallway in City Hall that she did not think I was a spy, “because if she had been, we would 
have been finished [så hade det varit kört]”. I took her comment to mean that she thought it 
was very unlikely that I was an undercover spy from AFA, sent to infiltrate them and make 
them look bad. It may not be trust, exactly, but given the difficulty of gaining their trust 
(elaborated on in chapter 2), it was some small success. All in all, I believe I succeeded in 
establishing an acceptable rapport with most of my interlocutors, by attempting to be as 
transparent and honest as I possibly could.  
 Zahle (2012) discusses the two parts of participant observation; participation and 
observation. Given the particularity of my chosen field, however, participation was not always 
possible – I could obviously not participate as a working politician, as I was neither a member 
of a political party nor elected to any office. Therefore, the emphasis during my fieldwork was 
generally on observation. I watched and listened to what was going on around me and took 
notes when possible. Nonetheless, I participated in what I could. I joined my interlocutors for 
lunch every day and dinner when they went out to restaurants, stood beside them in the cold 
when they were handing out fliers, and helped make coffee and clear plates before and after 
meetings. The plain fact of my being there helped me gain insight in much of the “tacit 
knowledge” (Zahle 2012), taken for granted by my interlocutors. I return to this topic below, 
under the heading of “fieldwork at home”.  
 Furthermore, in contrast to anthropological convention, I did not stay with my 
interlocutors, and did not see them much outside of working hours and a professional setting. 
This was a decision born out of several factors. First, my research focus was mostly on their 
professional activities and behaviour. Second, the private sphere is very private indeed in 
Sweden, and gaining access to a host family would surely have proven almost impossible. 
Third, I moved to Sweden with my fiancé, and we wanted our own place. I could surely have 
gained a different and possibly more varied set of data had I stayed with my interlocutors, but 
while that is the ideal in anthropology, it is far from unheard of to conduct fieldwork in less 
orthodox ways. Jon Harald Sande Lie (2013), for instance, considers the ways in which his 
fieldwork differed from Malinowski’s ideal. Studying the World Bank and a Ugandan ministry, 
Lie did not stay with his interlocutors, nor was he able to participate in many of his 
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interlocutors’ daily activities – just like me. He turned these difficulties into data; the 
impenetrability of the state and the challenges of access were important findings and told him 
something about the nature of his field. Nonetheless, he argues that a Malinowskian ideal of 
fieldwork is useful as an ideal to strive towards, though not always feasibly applicable in 
practice.  
 An additional quirk in my fieldwork was the fact that when my interlocutors left for the 
day, my “field” disappeared. Sawa Kurotani (2004) had a similar experience in her study of 
Japanese expatriates in the US. She conducted fieldwork with Japanese housewives in their 
domestic activities, but when their husbands returned home after work, she left. She argues that 
her research focus nevertheless made this largely unproblematic, as it was the housewives and 
the relationships between them that were her primary object of study. In a similar vein, my 
research focus was on my interlocutors’ professional activities, not their relationships with 
family and friends outside the spheres of their party political work.  
 Notetaking, however, a key tool in participant observation, proved more challenging 
than I had expected. In meetings and larger gatherings it was mostly unproblematic; I would 
sit in the back and quietly tap away on my iPad on which I took notes. In one-on-one 
interactions, however, it often hampered the discussions and gave the situation a stuffier, more 
interview-like feeling. It seemed to me that my interlocutors often stiffened when I had the 
iPad and keyboard in front of me. Therefore, I generally put it away and focused on having 
present and mindful talks with them, which appeared to relax them. I did my best to remember 
what they said and how the discussions progressed, and as soon as I had the chance, I would 
write out as much as I could remember into my notes. Occasionally, if they said something 
strikingly poignant, I would excuse myself, bring out the iPad and write it down, explaining 
that they put it so well that I did not want to risk forgetting it.  
 My interlocutors sometimes wondered about this approach. I was occasionally asked 
why I was not writing anything down, to which I replied that I wanted to be present in the 
moment, taking notes distracted me from the conversation, and assured them that I would take 
notes afterwards. I told them that I was mostly interested in their thoughts and worldview, not 
necessarily in particular quotes, even if I would like those, too.  
 I might have used a tape-recorder to record the conversations. However, I felt that a 
tape-recorder would have the same effect as obvious notetaking and cause my interlocutors to 
feel self-conscious, as if they were being interviewed by a journalist, rather than having a 
conversation with a student researcher. I thus decided against it. Nonetheless, I could probably 
have established the use of one early on, so that my interlocutors would have gotten used to it, 
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sidestepping the discomfort that I anticipated. If I could do it over again, I might have used a 
tape-recorder during informal chats and for clarifying semi-structured interviews, provided that 
I had done so consequently for some time and felt that my interlocutors were comfortable.  
A typical day would usually go as follows. I would normally come to City Hall around 
ten o’clock, when most of my City Hall interlocutors would have arrived. I would do the 
rounds, in no particular order, and pop into everyone’s offices and check on what they were 
doing. This would usually result in unstructured interviews or conversations, as they would tell 
me what they were working on, or I would ask about whatever I was wondering about. I would 
be careful to ask if they had the time and tell them I did not want to disturb their work, but they 
generally had the time to spare, and if they did not, I would go to the office next door. Around 
one o’clock, we would usually have lunch, informally chatting about anything that was on our 
minds. Sometimes we went out, but usually we ate in the City Hall lunch room. In the 
afternoons and evenings, I would sometimes go to the party office and meet with Annika and 
perhaps a party member or attend an Open House, or accompany an interlocutor to a city district 
committee meeting.  
As a final comment, it may be noted that my fieldwork, while of the SD, was conducted 
with a group of individuals. They may not always be representative of the party and its policies 
as a whole. Nevertheless, I would argue that, as most of them held elected positions within the 
party, their beliefs and actions were critical in shaping party policy and ideology.  
 
Positioning 
Concerning my own position, two features should be noted about me: first, I am quite “Nordic-
looking”; I am fairly tall, blonde, and blue-eyed, and second, I am a woman. There is no 
denying these two factors in particular may have influenced my access to data. It is an 
inevitable reality in fieldwork that one’s gender affects one’s access to and perspective on any 
given field – some questions become easier to ask, and some events stand out (Bernard 2017, 
296). Additionally, I looked like my interlocutors, talked like them, I even dressed like them. 
Ramalingam (2021) points out the difficulties she experienced as a researcher of colour (ROC) 
in conducting fieldwork among the SD. Initially, at least, she was mistrusted by her 
interlocutors, and was asked not to attend certain meetings or events as her presence would 
“confuse” participants (2021, 261). In stands to reason, then, that my being fair-skinned and 
blonde – the very picture of “Swedishness” – may have had the opposite effect and facilitated 
my access to the field. Kurotani (2004), however, emphasises the potential for a blurring of 
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self-other boundaries when coming from a similar background as one’s interlocutors. 
Nonetheless, I did not experience that particular issue to any significant extent. I did, however, 
sometimes worry about being associated with my interlocutors. This was uncomfortable for 
me as I strongly disagreed with my interlocutors’ politics and values. That is nevertheless a 
topic better suited for an ethical discussion, and I will elaborate on it below.  
 
Fieldwork at home  
As I grew up not far from Centreville, a few words must also be said about conducting 
fieldwork in one’s own society. This has become more common in recent decades, but still 
presents some methodological challenges. First, one generally avoids culture shock – for better 
and for worse. It makes it possible to start gathering data more quickly and might make it easier 
to navigate everyday necessities. Furthermore, one speaks the vernacular local language, which 
is helpful in communicating with one’s interlocutors. Knowing the language saves time and 
effort in learning a new language or finding and using a translator, as well as picking up on 
nuances and subtext which might otherwise be lost in translation. Nonetheless, culture shock 
can be of value, as it brings differences into sharp relief and allows the researcher to view a 
group, or a society, with fresh eyes (Bernard 2017).  
 Yet, although I was familiar with Centreville, national politics, and the language, I still 
experienced something like a culture shock in the first weeks with the SD. I had to learn the 
political jargon and abbreviations as well as the municipal and political organisational 
structure. Additionally, it was somewhat jarring to hear my interlocutors speak about things in 
a completely different way than what I was used to – I have generally always trusted the media, 
for example, which my interlocutors, as a rule, did not. Through observation, I learned 
appropriate ways to behave and talk (Zahle 2012), and which questions made sense to ask. 
Some of these tacit rules I knew from having grown up in Sweden, but some were entirely new 
to me, for instance, when and in what ways was it acceptable to joke about a newspaper or a 
journalist? When could “non-politically correct” comments be made? How did one talk to 
political opponents?  
 Furthermore, I grew up in a particular national imaginary, in which a hegemonic 
narrative about Sweden as a tolerant, democratic, multicultural society was dominant 
(Ramalingam 2012). While I have tried my best to suspend my own judgement (Bernard 2017, 
296), my upbringing in this particular imaginary has undoubtedly shaped my own values and 
worldview, and, as a corollary, my data and analysis. Nonetheless, I have tried to be aware of 
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this throughout the project, and done my utmost to be “sufficiently estranged from them” (Shah 
2017, 51), and attain “deliberate alienation from the world under study in order to understand 
it as it cannot understand itself” (Hastrup in Shah 2017, 51).  
 There was also the potential risk of running into my interlocutors outside of a research 
capacity, e.g., if I was out with a friend and happened to meet an interlocutor. This, fortunately, 
never happened. However, as a precaution, I have told my friends and family about the 
sensitive nature of my research and the importance of anonymisation, and that if it were to 
happen, they would promise to keep it to themselves.  
 
The pandemic  
As an ideal, fieldwork should be conducted over a long period of time (Shah 2017; Bernard 
2017). However, the 2020 covid-19 pandemic naturally affected both me, my fieldwork, and 
my interlocutors a great deal. My fieldwork was interrupted, though eventually concluded more 
or less in full, albeit in two blocs, separated by several months. I had planned to conduct 
fieldwork between January and June 2020, but instead I spent time in the field between 
January-March, and August-October 2020.  
Sweden’s approach to the pandemic has faced both domestic and international critique, 
and the country never implemented the lockdowns common in the rest of Europe. Sweden 
remained comparatively open, with mostly recommendations rather than regulations in effect. 
Nevertheless, in March 2020, my interlocutors decided to work from home, suddenly leaving 
me without a “field”. Meetings took place on Zoom or by phone and even the Municipal Board 
and Council meetings were affected as representatives allowed to attend were reduced to a bare 
minimum. Had I asked, I am sure I would have been allowed to sit in on Zoom meetings. 
However, no-one asked me, and I was wary of imposing. Moreover, I felt that the data I 
potentially would have gathered would be lacking regardless, as, in my opinion, body language 
and social dynamics are difficult (though of course possible) to assess and observe through a 
computer screen. Besides, we all (naively) thought that restrictions would not last more than a 
few months. Additionally, over the summer my interlocutors were on holiday, which meant 
that in June and July, there was nothing much for me to observe with regards to my research 
focus. Instead, I took the spring and summer months to immerse myself in reading, trying to 
get a head start on the theoretical part of this thesis. Nevertheless, I kept a close eye on Twitter, 
Facebook, and newspapers, and followed national and local politics closely. Information I 
gleaned online helped me to track what was going on and confirmed, to an extent, what I had 
 14 
learned through traditional fieldwork, but I have not used this data in this thesis as it was not 
systematically gathered.  
In  mid-August, as restrictions had lightened somewhat and my interlocutors were back 
from their vacations, I contacted Annika and asked how things were going, and was invited to 
come back the following week. Meetings were once again largely held in person, albeit with 
as few participants as possible and with attempts to keep physical distance. I remained in the 
field until late October, when restrictions hardened again due to the rising number of covid-19 
cases in Centreville. By then I had conducted roughly five months of fieldwork, at which point 
I exited the field. This was undramatic. I offered my interlocutors some pastries and they gave 
me a small, very sweet gift (a pair of warm socks and a plastic ring), wished me well, told me 
to contact them if I ever had any questions, and I repeated the same sentiments.  
The pause in fieldwork was, of course, not ideal, and certainly not planned. As it was, 
I ran the risk of my interlocutors never quite “getting used” to me (O'Reilly 2012, 87), as the 
pause between field stays was several months long. This may have affected reactivity during 
the second part of fieldwork and caused them to adjust their behaviour to influence my data, 
which may have been partly prevented by getting used to me if fieldwork had progressed as 
planned. Furthermore, as my thesis advisor Iselin Strønen pointed out, having too much theory 
in mind (since I read a lot during the summer) may make one blind to other analytical angles.  
 However, I believe the break may have offered some benefits as well. Indeed, Bernard 
(2017) considers a break in fieldwork a potentially good idea. He argues that it allows the 
researcher time and space to reflect on one’s insights up until that point, and focuses one’s 
efforts when one returns. This was my experience, as well. With a potential theoretical 
framework in mind it was, despite the potential downsides of temporarily leaving the field, 




Apart from the name of the Sweden Democrats, all names and places in this thesis have been 
anonymised and replaced with pseudonyms. Some non-essential details have been changed or 
omitted in order to avoid identification of individuals and places. I have tried to do this in a 
way that still retains the important contextual details within my data. This is, of course, a 
balancing act. I am still uncertain whether a dedicated person might still not be able to identify 
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the city, and thus easily my interlocutors. I have, however, attempted to make it as difficult as 
I possibly can, while still keeping informative contextual clues.  
 I identified the SD because I believe the party holds a special place in Swedish politics, 
and anonymising its name would, first, not have been possible – it would have been easy to 
identify it anyway, considering the way my interlocutors talk about other parties, and their own 
political views. Second, I would argue that naming the party and understanding it better yield 
a valuable insight into Swedish politics in general, which would not have been possible had 
the SD’s name been anonymised.  
 A related issue is that of my fiancé. While I am not politically affiliated, he is an active 
member of the Left Party. He joined the party some time after I had embarked upon fieldwork 
and we discussed it at length. I have thus been extremely careful not to divulge anything to him 
that I do not believe my interlocutors would want a political opponent to know, and only 
discussed the topics covered in this thesis, which will be submitted anyway. Naturally, I talked 
to my fiancé every day about my day and how things were going, but I took great care in 
choosing my words and topics. If there was something I felt strongly about but could not 
discuss, I wrote it down in a journal. On his part, my fiancé has been mindful when talking to 
his party acquaintances, not revealing the specifics of my field of study or anything related to 
it.  
I wondered whether or not to tell my interlocutors about my fiancé’s political activism, 
but since my advisor had suggested I not tell them about my own political standpoint unless 
they asked – and they never did – I never told them. I return to this below. Still, I am unsure 
whether I should have, but since my interlocutors never asked about my or my fiancé’s political 
views, I hope they understand.  
 
Informed consent  
In accordance with established research ethics, I did my utmost to attain informed consent from 
my interlocutors. My key interlocutors all signed an informed consent form with which I 
presented them. They kept one copy and I another. The form outlined the purpose and theme 
of the project and that I would shadow them, as well as who I was and for how long the 
fieldwork was meant to last. It also clearly stated that they could withdraw their consent at any 
time.  
At other times, however, it was too inconvenient to be feasible to ask for a signature, 
in which cases I chose to attain consent verbally. For instance, during Open House-meetings 
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with members, I would ask Annika to give me the floor at the beginning of the evening and 
introduce myself and my project, told them everyone would be anonymised, and encourage 
anyone who had any questions or qualms to come see me afterwards. If anyone came late and 
missed my introduction, I would slink over to them and quietly repeat it under my breath so as 
not to disturb the meeting. Furthermore, I printed out some “business cards” with my name and 
contact details and put them in plain sight next to the coffee dispensers during Open Houses. 
During my regular introductions of myself and my project, I told people that if they had any 
questions or wished to revoke their consent at any time, they could take a business card and 
contact me whenever and do so. I also regularly made a point of mentioning, in passing, 
something about “my thesis” or “my university” to gently remind my interlocutors that I was 
there in a research capacity.  
 In some rare cases, however, it was not possible to attain informed consent, for 
example, if I accompanied one of my interlocutors to a large exhibition or fair, as I did on a 
few occasions. I did not, of course, study or collect data about most of the people I saw there, 
but I was still present as a researcher. In those cases, I tried to focus on my interlocutors, and 
if we spoke with another person and I had a chance to interject, I would mention who I was 
and what I was doing.  
 In addition, I also signed a standard confidentiality agreement with Annika, which was 
a precondition for gaining access. It covered confidential information outside of the scope of 
my research questions. Whereas I was interested in the SD’s worldview and underlying logic, 
I was less concerned with confidential topics covered by the agreement, such as election 
strategies or upcoming votes in the Municipal Board or Council.  
 
Anthropology of “people we don’t (necessarily) like” 
One of the most challenging aspects of this project has been the fact that I strongly disagree 
with my interlocutors’ values and politics. How does one keep an objective (to the extent that 
that is possible) perspective of topics one cares deeply about? How does one write a fair (to the 
extent that that is possible) representation of “people we don’t (necessarily) like” (Bangstad 
2017)? Perhaps complicating the matter further, I did not dislike my interlocutors at all; in fact, 
most of the time I truly enjoyed their company. Nonetheless, I found their political views 
largely reprehensible.  
Fortunately, I have had some anthropological writings to guide me. First, I have tried 
to remain objective rather than value neutral (Bernard 2017, 295); to apply “empathy, not 
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sympathy” (Gingrich 2006, 11). In other words, I have strived to establish a rapport with my 
interlocutors through empathy, by connecting with them as people and suspending my own 
judgement (in an attempt at objectivity). Empathy, write Gingrich and Banks, “is indispensable 
for any seriously methodological focus on actors’ experiences and perspectives” (2006, 11). 
However, I also recognised that I do not sympathise with their views – that is, I am not, and 
could not be, value neutral. Gingrich and Banks, again, put this eloquently: “Sympathy is 
impossible because the basic orientation of neo-nationalism… is towards cultural exclusion 
and assimilation, an orientation that contradicts anthropology’s basic premise of socio-cultural 
diversity” (2006, 11). This, naturally, is reflected in my writing, as well. I have tried to refrain 
from valorising my interlocutors; to judge if they are “good” or “bad”; instead attempting to 
simply understand why they think and act in the ways that they do.  
Second, thorny issues of complicity and reciprocity inevitably arose. For example, 
having a smoke outside the SD’s party office, local party chairman Annika and Johanna, the 
leader of the SD’s local youth chapter, were talking about filming the recording of a podcast. 
Johanna had initially enlisted the help of a tech-savvy friend to film, but he had cancelled the 
appointment. Johanna and Annika were discussing how to solve this problem while I stood 
next to them. I have some experience with photography and videography and I knew that I 
would be able to help them. I also enjoyed the idea of being able to repay my interlocutors’ 
kindness and helpfulness, at least in a small way. Yet I was uneasy about actively participating 
in the dissemination of material whose content I personally found appalling. I agonised over 
the decision while they debated the issue, but finally I offered to help and Johanna gratefully 
accepted. I reasoned that the video would be made one way or the other regardless, and that it 
would be arrogant of me to assume that my modest skills would have any influence over voter 
sympathies. By offering my help, however, I hoped that I might be able to prove to my 
interlocutors that I could be trusted; that I was not out to make them look bad, I was only 
curious about their life-world. Nonetheless, the whole thing made me uncomfortable, and I am 
still not sure whether I did the right thing.  
Benjamin Teitelbaum (2019) argues that scholar-informant solidarity is vital, 
regardless of whether or not we like our subjects or what they stand for. Working with 
“(radical) nationalists”, he refers to his interlocutors as “friends” (Teitelbaum 2019, 414). 
Nonetheless, he stresses that in his work he defends nationalists, not nationalism. He concedes 
that this is an “immoral ethnography”, but an epistemologically indispensable one. Indeed, the 
kind of data we can gather through intimate engagement marked by trust and reciprocity is 
impossible to obtain through other means, and the knowledge thus gained, he suggests, trumps 
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the potential immorality of furthering causes that may be deplorable to us (Teitelbaum 2019, 
414). My own approach is similar in that I chose to reciprocally help my interlocutors, but I do 
not defend their politics.  
Finally – and crucially – as I oppose the SD’s politics, I am also, in Busher’s words, 
“keen to see [them] lose traction” (2021, 272). I share his argument that the way to counter 
their ideas and influence is to understand them better, and this can only be achieved by 
exploring their full range of agency; seeing one’s interlocutors “as people, capable of beauty, 
kindness, love, joy and creativity, just as they are capable of spite, unkindness, aggression and 
hate” (Busher et al. 2021, 271, emphasis in original). However, conducting fieldwork among 
people one ultimately wishes to see fail is complicated, to say the least. Following the “moral 
turn” (Kierans and Bell 2017) in anthropology, scholars within the discipline have, following 
Nancy Scheper-Hughes (1995), called for a “witness”-approach, where the anthropologist has 
a responsibility to act as a witness, promoting the interests of those she studies, who are – 
generally – the oppressed and vulnerable in a society. This approach has been criticised by Roy 
D’Andrade (1995), among others, who asks what becomes of our methodological relativism if 
we start moralising and deciding what is good or bad about the people we study. What 
responsibility, then, do I have towards my interlocutors, versus what I, personally, believe 
would be in the best interest of society at large? To turn Scheper-Hughes’ point on its head, 
am I a “witness”, not on behalf of my interlocutors, but on behalf of vulnerable sectors of 
society, potentially (in my view) at risk of being hurt by the SD’s politics? Or am I a passive 
bystander, simply a methodological relativist?  
I would never wish to harm my interlocutors; however, nor do I want to see them 
succeed. How can these two positions be reconciled? I have no satisfying or conclusive answer. 
However, I would tentatively suggest that the two may, in fact, be aligned: by taking my 
interlocutors seriously and attempting to understand their grievances and worldviews on their 
own terms, I satisfy the demand for methodological relativism. By potentially making the 
knowledge thus gained legible to others who, perhaps, do not understand the SD – thereby 
providing tools for counter measurements – I satisfy the demand for “witnessing”.  
Prior to fieldwork, I had agonised over whether or not to tell my interlocutors from the 
beginning that I disagreed with their politics. Under advice from my academic advisor, though, 
I decided not to volunteer the information, but happily tell them if they ever asked. However, 
they never did. I told them several times that they were welcome to, if the conversation seemed 
to be nearing the subject, but they politely shook their heads and declined. The closest anyone 
ever came was during a lecture with a visiting member of Parliament (MP), when a member 
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asked if I was politically active (politiskt engagerad) in a party. I said that I was not, and he 
did not pursue the topic.  
 
Research questions, thematic focus, and chapter overview 
In its early stages, this project asked the most overarching question possible: Why do the SD 
believe what they believe? As fieldwork progressed, more focused questions began to 
crystallise, such as: Is the SD populist, and if so, in what ways? Why do they mistrust the media 
as well as state and municipal institutions, and how is this mistrust articulated? Is the SD “left” 
or “right”, and does this continuum even make sense in their case? How do they imagine “the 
nation”, and what role does this vision play in shaping their policies and worldview? Does the 
SD’s nationalism co-exist with global trends of neoliberalism and globalisation, and if so, how?  
 In chapter 1, I will sketch out the SD’s background; how the party came into being and 
its journey up until the time of writing. I will also outline the political scene and organisation 
in Swedish national politics. These sections are important to understand how the SD is 
positioned in the Swedish political landscape. Finally, the main theoretical foundation for this 
thesis, Ernesto Laclau’s theory on populist reason (2005), will be laid out. I will argue that the 
party’s self-identification with “the people” is crystallised through chains of equivalences: by 
establishing a common identity through unsatisfied demands, “the people” is pitted against “the 
elites” who deny these demands.  
 In the second chapter, I shall consider my interlocutors’ prominent and almost 
omnipresent mistrust. This will be done in a dialectic discussion with Laclau and Florian 
Mühlfried (2019). I will argue that my interlocutors’ mistrust of “elites” – mainstream media, 
political representatives from other parties, as well as state and municipal institutions – made 
the populist antagonism between “the elites” and “the people” manifest. It will also be 
suggested that my interlocutors had a certain confirmation bias; the closer a source was 
believed to be to their own political position, the more it could be trusted. Nevertheless, they 
were ambivalent about sources perceived to be right-wing extremist – while the content of such 
materials was often felt to be reasonable, my interlocutors were told by the party leadership 
that the sources themselves were “racist” and thus not to be trusted. Finally, I suggest that this 
ambivalence may be a strategy on the SD’s part: by being vague enough on what was and was 
not acceptable, they were able to integrate as many demands as possible into their chain of 
equivalence. By maintaining some boundaries, however, cohesion and a sense of community 
were retained. 
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 Chapter 3 will be centred around a discussion of nationalism, and I will argue that my 
interlocutors’ idea of “the nation” acts as an “empty signifier” which crystallises the SD’s 
identity. Considering ethnographic examples showing my interlocutors’ ideas about 
“Swedishness” and national belonging, I will suggest that essentially all my interlocutors’ 
demands, heterogenous as they were, were subsumed under “the nation” as empty signifier, 
which also in turn shaped their demands. Finally, I will consider how nationalism and populism 
co-constitute one another through establishing a symbolic equivalence between “the nation” 
and “the people”.  
 In the fourth and final chapter, I will examine some of the ways in which my 
interlocutors interact with local and global ideas about neoliberalism. I will propose that a 
neoliberal logic, as well as nationalism, is present in shaping my interlocutors’ worldview. I 
show this by examining how welfare chauvinism, while nationalist in my interlocutors’ 
rhetoric, was also underpinned by neoliberal ideas about “responsibilization”. Through a brief 
comparative discussion of the SD’s similarities and differences with the populist radical right 
in Hungary, I will suggest that neoliberalism and nationalism are entangled in multifaceted 
ways and combine in shaping my interlocutors’ worldview.  
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Chapter 1  
Constituting ”The People”  
 
Introduction  
This chapter will form the backdrop to the rest of this thesis. I will outline the SD’s history and 
electoral success, the Swedish political landscape and organisation, as well as previous 
scholarly work on the SD and radical right-wing parties. Lastly, I will briefly sketch out Ernesto 
Laclau’s (2005) theory on populist reason and argue that it is an especially relevant theoretical 
framework through which to analyse the SD.  
 
The Sweden Democrats are born 
The founding of the SD is still somewhat shrouded in mystery. My interlocutors had different 
versions which were, in turn, different from official as well as critical versions. Most sources 
seem to agree, however, that the SD was founded in 1988 (Widfeldt 2015). The early 
membership cadre was partly, but not exclusively, made up of several neo-Nazi sympathisers, 
the number of which is debated (Widfeldt 2015; Sverigedemokraterna 2008). The party was 
established by the remains of The Sweden Party (Sverigepartiet, SvP, established in 1986), 
which in turn had grown out of The Progress Party (Framstegspartiet, established in 1968) and 
Keep Sweden Swedish (Bevara Sverige Svenskt, BSS, established in 1979). All groups shared, 
albeit in various degrees, anti-immigrant and right-wing notions (Widfeldt 2015). A splinter 
faction from SvP eventually broke out and created the SD in 1988.  
 The SD’s success has been exponential. The first two decades saw a very slow but fairly 
steady increase in votes. An important moment for the young party came in 2001, when the 
party split into two factions: the SD, and the more radical Nationaldemokraterna (the National 
Democrats, the ND). In a book with collected essays from various SD front figures, party leader 
Jimmie Åkesson wrote about this time that “many remaining basket cases [tokstollar] quickly 
found their way there” (Sverigedemokraterna 2008), which paved the way for an even more 
pronounced mainstream party profile.  
 In the last decades of the previous millennium and up until 2010, Sweden was 
considered an exception in Western politics, with its glaring absence of a radical right party in 
Parliament (Widfeldt 2015). There was the short-lived tenure of the xenophobic party New 
Democracy (Ny Demokrati, established in 1991) between 1991-1994, with 26 out of 349 seats 
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in Parliament (Widfeldt 2015), but otherwise, Sweden had no such parliamentary parties. That 
is, until 2010, when the SD entered Parliament with a meagre 5,7% of votes and 20 seats in 
Parliament (Widfeldt 2015). Between its inception and entrance into Parliament, the party had 
worked hard to change its image. They implemented a zero-tolerance policy for extremism and 
excluded members that were deemed unsuitable. Despite this, the SD was plagued with 
scandals, internal conflicts and dramatic drop-outs.  
 Another important shift from its early, radical days to a more polished image was the 
appointment of Jimmie Åkesson as party leader in 2005 (Widfeldt 2015). Under his leadership, 
the party softened some of its more radical stances (e.g., pro- death penalty and anti-abortion), 
which, as noted, caused some of the more radical proponents to leave the party and seek a 
platform elsewhere. Today, the SD calls itself a “social conservative party” and their main 
issues are immigration, national security, and national cohesion.  
Since 2005, the SD has grown rapidly, at the time of writing (autumn 2021) polling at 
around 20% (Sjörén 2021), making it the third largest party in Swedish politics. Especially 
following the “refugee crisis” of 2015, the SD’s support skyrocketed.  
 
A brief overview of Swedish politics  
National politics in Sweden was, up until the late 2000’s, fairly evenly and straight-forwardly 
divided into two blocs: the political Left, consisting of the Left Party (Vänsterpartiet, V), the 
Social Democrats (Socialdemokraterna, S), the Green Party (Miljöpartiet, MP); and the 
political Right, consisting of the right-wing coalition Alliansen (The Alliance). This was made 
up of the Centre Party (Centerpartiet, C), the Liberals (Liberalerna, L, previously Folkpartiet), 
the Christian Democrats (Kristdemokraterna, KD), and the Moderates (Moderaterna, M). The 
two largest parties, dominating the political arena, have traditionally been S and M, whose 
party leaders have become prime ministers and led the government. The SD has to date never 
been part of any formal coalition in Parliament.  
 With the entrance of the SD into Parliament in 2010, however, the political status quo 
began creaking at the seams. The SD was initially treated as a political pariah with a solid 
cordon sanitaire. As late as 2018, just before the September general election, party leader for 
the Moderates Ulf Kristersson made a heavily publicised promise that he would never work 
with the SD (Tenitskaja 2019). Since then, things have changed rapidly. Kristersson and his 
right-wing coalition lost the election by a hair, the victory instead going to a fragile centre-left 
coalition led by Social Democratic prime minister Stefan Löfvén. This coalition was born 
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primarily out of a desire to maintain the cordon sanitaire against the SD and minimise their 
influence. The old centre-right bloc Alliansen broke down after almost fifteen years of 
cooperation, as the Centre Party and the Liberals agreed to enter into a coalition with the Social 
Democrats and the Green Party. The Left Party was not a part of this coalition, but endorsed it. 
In the years since the 2018 election, the cordon sanitaire against the SD has all but broken 
down. The Moderates claim that they will not form a government with the SD, but the SD 
would in all likelihood gain considerable influence over national politics if there is a shift in 
government in the 2022 election.  
 At the time of my fieldwork in 2020, general and municipal elections were two years 
away, due in 2022.  
 
Political organisation  
Sweden is a constitutional monarchy with legislative Parliament and executive government, 
led by a prime minister. The nation is organisationally divided into overlapping levels: 25 
provinces (landskap), 21 counties (regioner), and 290 municipalities (kommuner). Centreville, 
in turn, was during the time of my fieldwork divided into a number of city districts, each of 
which had its own committee. In addition, there were also professional committees for, for 




Figure 1. The author in City Hall in front of an attempted explanation of Sweden's administrative organisation 
 
My interlocutors were primarily concerned with municipal politics, which was organised in 
levels of increasing reach of authority. On the lowest level there were the professional and city 
district committees, with representatives from political parties proportionately given seats in 
accordance with municipal election results. Above that, there was the Municipal Board (MB) 
– not to be confused with the Municipal Council (MC), which was the highest organ in the city. 
The Municipal Board was made up of political representatives with seats proportionately 
distributed according to election results; all in all about 15 people. The board made day-to-day 
decisions and meetings were not open to the public. The board met every other week and its 
speaker was the local leader for the governing party. In Centreville during the time of my 
fieldwork, the speaker was from the right-wing party the Moderates. Municipal Council 
meetings, on the other hand, were open to the public and were held once a month. The Council 
consisted of more than sixty politicians and was also led by a speaker from the Moderates.  
 Behind the scenes, as it were, were officials [tjänstemän] – working in the city 
management office, executing what the politicians decided. They were, crucially, not 
politically affiliated (in any official terms, though, presumably, privately).  
The SD, in turn, was organised as follows. At its lowest levels, there were local 
associations [föreningar] on a municipal level, e.g., SD Centreville. Then, there were regional 
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associations, and finally, the national association, colloquially referred to as “riks” (short for 
“riksdagsgruppen”, the Parliamentary group). These associations were sites for members and 
political decision-making, whereas the political work took place in the Municipal Boards and 
Councils, County Councils, and Parliament, respectively. My interlocutors were thus members 
of the local SD Centreville association, and worked in municipal politics (though one or two 
held seats in the County Council, too).  
 
About Centreville and the field 
Centreville is a relatively, by Swedish standards, large coastal city in the south of Sweden. Its 
population is mostly urban and the city boasts a rich cultural scene with a plethora of bars, 
restaurants, museums, and concerts. The city was founded in the 1600’s but was burned and 
pillaged by Danish troops several times during occasional border conflicts. Centreville was and 
is an important industrial city with good communication and export lines to the rest of the 
continent.  
 For decades, Centreville, like many parts of Sweden, was governed by the Social 
Democrats. Today, however, the city is governed by the old right-wing Allians-parties, the 
Moderates, the Centre party, the Liberals, and the Christian Democrats. Also represented in the 
Municipal Board and Council were the Social Democrats, the Green Party, the Left Party, the 
SD, and a local party which I will refer to simply as the Local Party.  
 My “field”, such as it was, was mostly centred in City Hall and the SD’s party office. 
The two buildings were strikingly different. City Hall was an imposing, historical structure in 
the city’s central square. After entering through the reception, one was met by a vast, high-
ceilinged hall, lined on its side by floors of corridors with offices where politicians and their 
political secretaries worked. The wood, covering the floors and walls, was a warm, walnut 
colour, but large windows facing a small courtyard provided ample lighting. On the top floor 
were the SD’s offices, home to Mats, Gunilla, Hampus, Johan, and Thomas. Their offices were 
reached through a bright, modern communal kitchen and eating area with several large tables, 
through a narrow corridor with a conference room, until one reached a long hallway lined with 
my interlocutors’ offices. There was, in addition, an extra office which stood mostly unused, 
which I occasionally occupied.  
 The SD’s party office, on the other hand, was quite a bit outside the city centre in a 
semi-industrial area. It was on the second floor, reached through a narrow staircase, and 
consisted of Annika’s and Gudrun’s offices, a small kitchen with a table and some chairs, a 
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bathroom, and a fairly large, open room, where lectures and meetings were regularly held. All 
in all it was roughly the size of a two-bedroom flat.  
 
Introducing the main characters 
My key interlocutors all worked full-time with politics but occupied various positions.  
 Annika, my point person and gatekeeper, was 29 years old and chairman of the local 
SD association. Among other things, she handled membership issues, organised events, and 
dealt with the media. She was also an SD representative in a city district committee, as well as 
in a professional county committee. She probably worked at least 60 hours a week and was 
always in full control, but quick to laugh. Holding a diploma from university in physical 
therapy, she had come to work for the SD fulltime for the last two years.  
 Mats was the SD’s municipal councillor, meaning he was the local SD politician in 
charge. He had been a party member since 2010. He was in his 40’s, hair greying at the temples, 
and almost always wore an impeccable suit and tie. His voice was booming and loud and could 
be heard from another floor of City Hall.  
 Gunilla worked as a political secretary for Mats but was also one of seven Municipal 
Council representatives for the SD. In her late 40’s, she had naturally dark-blonde hair and was 
the office’s unofficial fixer – she bought pastries and sandwiches for meetings and always kept 
things running smoothly. I spent the majority of my time in City Hall in an armchair in her 
office.  
 Hampus was the only one of my key interlocutors not holding an elected office. He was 
in charge of economic issues and could usually be found in front of his two large computer 
screens pouring over massive Excel sheets. He was the youngest of the bunch in his late 30’s.  
 Johan was a political secretary but a municipal councillor in a neighbouring 
municipality. He used to be a CEO for a fairly large production company but found his calling 
in politics in his 40’s. He was soft-spoken but charismatic, and I never saw him wearing 
anything but immaculate grey suits.   
 Thomas, too, was another one of Mats’s four political secretaries as well as a Municipal 
Council representative. He also sat in a few professional committees.  
 
Scholarly contributions  
There is a dearth of anthropological studies of the SD, with at least one notable exception, a 
benchmark study by Vidhya Ramalingam (2012). She conducted fieldwork with the party 
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around the time it entered Parliament in 2010. Even though her fieldwork is more than a decade 
old at the time of writing (2021) and much has happened since then, her analysis is strikingly 
insightful even today. She explored the stigma surrounding the SD, noting how “norms” and 
“anti-norms” are constructed and negotiated by various political actors. Significantly, she 
concludes that the SD casts itself in the role as “victim” of anti-democratic attempts at silencing 
the party, expertly drawing on liberal norms of freedom of speech and equality.  
 Furthermore, she shows how the Swedish national self-image as a “beacon of 
democracy and equality” (Ramalingam 2012, 8) is a rather recent phenomenon and traces it 
back to post-WWII efforts to distance the nation from its dubious neutrality during the war. 
Racism, xenophobia, and intolerance were indeed quite common in Sweden for a long time in 
the 20th century, and the Social Democrats – today proudly proclaiming its inclusivity – “were 
instrumental in propagating fears about war-time immigration” (Ramalingam 2012, 8). 
However, after the war, there was a concerted effort to change the national self-image to one 
of humanitarianism and multiculturalism. The stakes in this effort were high as this self-image 
became increasingly understood as the national identity – to “be Swedish” was to be 
humanitarian and tolerant. Against this backdrop, Ramalingam understands the rise of the SD, 
embodying a resistance to this national self-image of Sweden as a multicultural nation, as a 
threat to the very national identity. Stigma against the SD is thus deeply rooted in an almost 
existential fear, in her understanding.  
In general, however, studies of the SD have mostly been carried out by sociologists 
(e.g., Mulinari and Neergaard 2014), political scientists (e.g., Oskarson and Demker 2015) and 
journalists (e.g., Larsson 2001). Such studies generally examine the SD’s voter base and 
attempt to draw conclusions from it (Oskarson and Demker 2015; Jylhä et. al 2019), analysing 
supply- and demand side dimensions. Other works instead suggest definitions of the party’s 
ideological basis and practice and attempt to predict future developments (Hellström and 
Nilsson 2010). Journalistic works have scrutinised the SD’s past and present indiscretions 
(Larsson 2001). Within these and other contributions, a plethora of labels are used to describe 
the SD, such as “extreme-right”, “radical right”, “populist-nationalist”, “populist radical right” 
(PRR). Throughout this thesis, I sometimes employ the term “populist-nationalist”, as I argue 
that the party is characterised by both populism and nationalism – an argument which will be 
elaborated on throughout the ensuing chapters.  
While some of these non-anthropological works employ qualitative research methods 
at least in part (e.g., Mulinari and Neergaard 2014), I would argue that their background in 
these other disciplines nonetheless yields a rather etic understanding of its subjects. 
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Ethnography and anthropological analysis can, in contrast, be valuable in contextualising and 
nuancing these works. Furthermore, there have been especially few contributions, both from 
anthropology as well as other disciplines, focused on politicians themselves, and here I believe 
this thesis could be a valuable contribution1.  
 On the general theme of right-wing populism and nationalism, however, 
anthropologists have in recent years produced a growing body of research. From Sri Lanka and 
Australia (Kapferer 2011) to Hungary and England (Thorleifsson 2019b; Schiering 2021; Hann 
2016; Kalb 2018), scholars have explored various approaches to radical right-wing movements. 
Common lines of analysis include considerations of local histories and norms (Hann 2016), 
class (Kalb 2018), and resentment and insecurities in a globalising world (Thorleifsson 2019a). 
Cathrine Thorleifsson (2019a), for instance, compares the ultra-nationalist Jobbik party in 
Hungary with the pro-Brexit party UKIP in the UK. Despite some glaring differences in their 
origins and ideological foundations, she finds certain striking similarities between the two 
parties. Both, she argues, racialize minorities – especially Muslims – by using populist 
nationalist rhetoric, pitting immigrants, monolithically understood as a threat to national purity, 
against the defenders of the nation and a Christian civilisation in danger (Thorleifsson 2019a, 
14).  
 Additionally, anthropologists have increasingly begun studying populism (Mazzarella 
2019; Hann 2019), but to my knowledge no such works have been done on the SD, which is 
where this thesis enters into dialogue with this growing body of research. Below I outline my 
theoretical approach, arguing that populism is a particularly useful analytical lens through 
which to understand the complexities within SD’s worldview.  
 
Why populism? And what is it?  
If one calls up the SD’s party website, the first thing that pops up in bold, red letters is the text: 
“Welcome to the people’s movement the Sweden Democrats!” (Sverigedemokraterna 2021). 
Every political party, of course, claims to represent “the people”, but the SD makes its claim 
unusually explicit in their self-appointed designation as “the people’s movement”. Not only 
their website draws attention to this, but it was frequently invoked by my interlocutors as well. 
One of the first instances in which the party’s claim to be “the people” became clear to me was 
during a talk by an SD member of Parliament (MP). The air was heavy with anticipation and 
 
1 A noteworthy exception is Cathrine Thorleifsson’s work (2019a) with Jobbik and UKIP politicians. However, 
she mostly conducted interviews with these politicians, rather than “deep hanging out” (Geertz in Kurotani 
2004, 210). 
 29 
the faint smell of coffee from the café below. We were in a venue in the city centre where an 
MP was hosting a talk. About fifty people had gathered in the large room, padding the well-
worn wooden chairs with their coats, hanging on the MP’s every word. One middle-aged 
woman in the audience raised her hand. She said that it does not feel like the government cares 
about the people because many feel unsafe but the state does not do anything about it. The MP 
nodded. “There’s definitely a big gap between the state and the people”, he said. “The SD is 
the only party that’s growing… other parties just have small interest groups, not wide people’s 
movements. And I don’t think other parties have these kinds of meetings.”  
Both the woman in the audience and the MP invoked the idea of “the people” as 
opposed to “the state” or “the government”. This antagonistic dichotomy stayed with me, and 
I began to notice it in other comments and events.  
 There are as many ways of approaching the SD analytically as there are researchers, 
but in this thesis, I will primarily apply an analytical perspective focused on populism; more 
specifically, Ernesto Laclau’s theory on populist reason (2005). I argue that this approach to 
populism is a particularly useful analytical framework through which to understand the SD as 
it allows us to conceptualise many of the multifaceted, complex ways the party operates and 
understands the world and themselves. It captures, for instance, how the SD constitutes itself 
as “the people”, how the party can represent so many heterogeneous demands under the same 
organisational umbrella, and why it can be so difficult to pinpoint exactly where on the classic 
political Left-Right spectrum the party belongs.  
Some theories about populism focus on the concept’s vagueness and attempt to 
determine some ideological or political content (e.g., Canovan and Germani in Laclau 2005). 
Laclau (2005) does the opposite – he argues that populism is not an ideology, but rather a 
political logic. In other words, widely different movements can apply the same populist logic. 
What they all have in common is the division between two antagonistic camps, usually “the 
people” versus “the elite”.  
 In the remainder of this chapter, I will outline Laclau’s theory concerning populist 
reason and use it to examine how the SD constructs itself as “the people”. This examination 
takes us through chains of equivalence, antagonism, and empty signifiers. These concepts also 
partly overlap with the structure of this thesis (with the exception of the last chapter): chapter 
1 deals with chains of equivalence, chapter 2 with antagonism, and chapter 3 with empty 
signifiers. Throughout this thesis, then, I will draw on Laclau to consider various aspects of the 
SD’s worldview.  
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Naturally, other political parties and configurations follow the same populist logic as 
the SD to various degrees. Laclau himself recognises this, writing that “populism is the royal 
road to understanding something about the ontological constitution of the political as such” 
(2005, 67). Yet, as noted above, the SD is interesting to study as it makes its claim to be “the 
people” unusually explicit as they call themselves a “people’s movement”.  
Laclau’s (2005) theory on populist reason is, however, a notoriously difficult read. As 
this thesis is not a theoretical discussion, I will limit myself to the very basics. In its simplest 
form, the theory is about how “the people” is constructed as an historical actor primarily 
through unsatisfied social demands, empty signifiers, and antagonism. I will attempt to explain 
these in order.  
 Laclau’s minimal unit of analysis is not the group or the individual, but rather the social 
demand. As illustration, he gives the example of agrarian migrants who arrive in the outskirts 
of a city. They request, for example, housing. If the demand is satisfied that is the end of the 
story. If, however, it is not, people may begin to notice that their neighbours also have 
unsatisfied demands; e.g., calls for clean water or schooling. These different demands may 
begin to enter into a chain of equivalence – they are united in not having their demands met, 
against the powerholders who deny them. This is the early stage of a populist configuration 
(Laclau 2005, 73-74).  
To become more than a loose chain of unsatisfied demands, however, and become “the 
people”, the chain must be consolidated through an empty signifier. To explain what an empty 
signifier is, Laclau takes the reader on a journey through Saussurian semiotics, which I will 
sidestep here for the simple sake of legibility and focus on where his argument ultimately ends 
up. In my reading, an empty signifier is, at its core, a way to conceptualise and represent “the 
people”. It is a name, or a demand, which has no relation to a signified (the thing to which the 
name refers). In other words, the link between signifier and signified is severed. There is no a 
priori content to the empty signifier, no real content to which it refers. It must be filled with 
radical investment – in other words, “the people” chooses, to an extent, how to define itself, 
but is also defined through the empty signifier. If, for instance (as I argue later on), “the nation” 
acts as an empty signifier, the way my interlocutors understand “the nation” comes to decide 
which demands can be incorporated into the chain of equivalence; in this case demands that 
can be understood to promote “the nation”. Crucially, what “the nation” means is established 
through radical investment by populist actors. However, this construction of meaning works 
both ways. The demands, incorporated by populist actors through their radical investment in 
the meaning of an empty signifier, also affect that empty signifier’s meaning. If one of the 
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incorporated demands call for ethnic homogeneity, for example, that affects the meaning of 
“the nation” as an empty signifier, as it becomes understood as an ethnically homogenous 
nation. In order to incorporate as many demands as possible, the empty signifier must be vague 
enough to satisfy the heterogeneity of the demands, but be defined clearly enough to still 
provide cohesion and a sense of community.  
Furthermore, “the people” is defined in opposition to an Other – in order to have an 
“inside”, there must be an “outside”; there must be a “them” if there is to be an “us”. “The 
people” claims to represent everyone in a given society, but as it also makes demands of those 
who deny their claims – most often “the elite” – it does, in fact, not represent everyone, and 
could not, as it would lose its constitutive outside. “The people” is thus constructed through an 
internal antagonistic frontier (Laclau 2005). The impossibility of “the people” as a totality is 
also why the empty signifier must be empty: it cannot refer to “the people” as a totality, because 
there is no such totality. Hence, “the people’s” identity, its representation, relies on an empty 
signifier, whose meaning is constructed through radical investment.  
However, this internal frontier is not necessarily always stable (Laclau 2005, 131). If 
competing populist projects lay claims on an empty signifier, it is filled with various, contested 
meanings (Moraes 2014). It thus becomes a floating signifier. I return to this in chapter 3.  
In this chapter, I have presented an overview of the SD’s background, as well as the 
Swedish political landscape and organisation. I have also sketched the basics of Laclau’s theory 









Chapter 2  




I am in City Hall in Mats’s office, perched on the edge of his sofa. Everything is blue. The 
sofa, the tablecloth with SD’s blue hepatica logo on the side table, the chairs. Even Mats’s 
eyes are blue as he turns from his cluttered desk to look at me. We are doing an 
unstructured interview and I have just asked him why the SD is being smeared 
[smutskastade], which my interlocutors routinely complain about. “Why would journalists 
write things about you if they are not true?” I ask curiously. He thinks for a moment, 
searching for the words. He then explains that it is partly because newspapers get clicks if 
they write about the SD – preferably scandals –, partly because the party just cannot shake 
its past, and partly because other parties are afraid of them. It is not that prime minister 
Stefan Löfvén actually thinks they are going to start a concentration camp, Mats explains, 
but the PM is scared to share his power and means.  
“If I were to say that ‘I like red’, the media would write ‘he hates blue’ – but I didn’t say 
anything about blue!”, Mats says animatedly, and continues: “if Jimmie Åkesson [SD party 
leader] could walk on water, the media would write that ‘Jimmie Åkesson can’t swim’… 
It’s the same if I’d say I’m proud to be white.” He whooshes and winces. “The amount of 
shit I’d get! But I am proud to be white, and if I’d been black I would’ve been proud to be 
black.”  
 
This brief empirical vignette contains some interesting information. Throughout Mats’s 
comments, there is a theme of mistrust and suspicion, from the fact that he believes his party 
is being smeared, to his impression that it is because other parties do not want to share their 
power and means, to his insistence that the media deliberately distorts the facts.  
 His words made explicit a logic of mistrust that pervaded my time in the field: the SD 
representatives and members I studied believed that institutions were politically biased and that 
the mainstream media was prejudiced against the party, and thus both were treated with 
mistrust and suspicion. Two recurring rationales in particular emerged for this perception – 
first, both institutions and the media were believed to be naive and not see the actual state of 
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Swedish society, and second, they were thought to be afraid to lose their power to the SD and 
so worked against them in a way they did not work against other political parties.  
While Laclau’s theory on populism (2005) offers a fruitful point of entry into an 
analysis of the life-world of my SD interlocutors, it does not fully account for the prevalence 
among my informants of the theme of trustworthiness. It is to this theme I now turn.  
In this chapter, I will consider some aspects of this apparent mistrust, and show how 
radical mistrust (Mühlfried 2019) was manifest in certain situations, and nuancing and 
ambivalent attitudes in others. I will argue that, in general, a source’s trustworthiness was in 
direct relation to its perceived position on the political scale – the further from one’s own 
position, the less the source was perceived as trustworthy. This is arguably nothing new: 
confirmation bias has been studied in numerous psychological works (e.g. Dibbets, Borger, 
and Nederkoorn 2021; Kappes et.al 2020). Nonetheless, I believe it is instructive to study it 
through ethnographic material to better understand how it works in practice. Furthermore, I 
will show the ambivalence that set in among my interlocutors when a source – a newspaper, 
the city management office, a political representative from another party, etc., – was thought 
to stray too far to the political Right. If a source was perceived to be left-leaning, more or less 
radical mistrust tended to set in among my interlocutors, but attitudes to perceived right-wing 
sources were more ambivalent. The source – the sender – often seemed to matter more to my 
interlocutors than the actual content of the material. This became clear in the obvious 
ambivalence among my interlocutors concerning which news sources were and were not 
acceptable and trustworthy, both to the party leadership and mainstream society. I will suggest 
that this ambivalence may be a strategy on the SD’s part: by being vague enough on what is 
and is not acceptable, they are able to integrate as many demands as possible into their chain 
of equivalence. By maintaining some boundaries, however, cohesion and a sense of community 
are retained. Finally, I suggest that an already present antagonism between “the people” – and 
the SD as self-designated representatives of “the people” – and “the elite” becomes manifest 
through more or less overt mistrust.  
A general sense of suspicion was pervasive among my interlocutors, but this is of 
course not to say that my interlocutors were all pathologically suspicious conspiracy-theorists. 
My intention is only to show that it was a particular logic and mode of relating to the world. I 
will focus here on two loose, albeit interrelated, categories: suspicion of corruption and bias. 
My interlocutors generally suspected state and municipal institutions in particular to be more 
or less corrupt because of long-serving, purportedly Social-Democrat sympathising officials. I 
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understand “corruption” here in a broad, colloquial meaning, as “illegal, bad, or dishonest 
behaviour, especially by people in positions of power” (Cambridge Dictionary 2021).  
Second, my interlocutors also suspected different media (especially mainstream and 
public service media) to be lacking in objectivity and of treating the SD unfairly. These 
suspicions were generally explained by my interlocutors partly by mainstream political parties’ 
and media’s purported naivety, and partly by these actors’ perceived fear of losing power. 
However, some institutions and media outlets were deemed more trustworthy than others, and 
more so in certain situations than others. Understanding the work put into establishing when 
and to what extent an actor may be trusted tells us something valuable about populist logic, 
antagonism, and my interlocutors’ life-world. I will situate these suspicions and logics within 
a theoretical framework based on Laclau (2005) and Mühlfried (2019).   
 
Understanding mistrust 
Apart from Laclau’s (2005) theory, which runs as a theoretical vein throughout this thesis, in 
this chapter I will also draw on Mühlfried’s analysis (2019) of (mis)trust in a Georgian setting. 
The field from which Mühlfried draws his examples is of course radically different from my 
Swedish field, both in historic and cultural-economic conditions. Nonetheless, I believe that 
his analysis of the ways in which mistrust operates is still relevant to my case.  
Mühlfried views mistrust as an active endeavour, entailing a large amount of work to 
establish to what extent someone or something may or may not be trusted. He points out that 
mistrust is not the same as the absence of trust, which rather “leads to fear or indifference and 
thus to passive attitudes that have nothing to do with mistrust” (Mühlfried 2019, 8). The cost-
intensity of mistrust results from having to operate on two levels in a mistrustful interaction: 
the surface, overt level, showing hospitality and friendliness, and the underground, covert level, 
where mistrust is located. In order to maintain status quo and ensure friendly relations, this 
underground level must not become apparent, as that might “cause – or manifest – antagonism” 
(Mühlfried 2019, 43).  Mistrust also works through the overt level, however, allowing the 
subject to glean information about the mistrusted and evaluate their trustworthiness. 
Nonetheless, maintaining two levels of interaction is an energy-draining and complex 
endeavour. Mühlfried contrasts this with another mode of relating: radical distrust. Here such 
work is reduced to a minimum, as the mistrusted is dismissed as totally untrustworthy, period. 
I thus understand mistrust among my interlocutors as on a continuum between mistrust as an 
active endeavour, and radical mistrust.  
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A salient point in Mühlfried’s analysis is his conclusion that mistrust also has the 
potential to be constructive, as a certain amount of mistrust serves to “keep a suspicious eye on 
the state” (Mühlfried 2019, 8).  
 
Suspicion of corruption  
As noted above, a common suspicion among my interlocutors was that state institutions and 
other mainstream political parties (i.e., “elites”) were corrupt: either infiltrated by officially 
apolitical officials with a purported hidden agenda, or through treating the SD differently than 
other parties based on a fear of losing their own power and means. This was made clear to me 
during a meeting which I attended for Municipal Council representatives from the SD. The 
purpose of the meeting was to go over the items on the agenda for an upcoming Municipal 
Council meeting later that week. We were in City Hall and about 15-20 minutes before the 
meeting was to start, a few of the representatives had gathered in Mats’s office, making small 
talk. Just as I was walking in, one of the representatives, Jakob, complained that: “officials are 
so marinated in all this because sossarna [slang for the Social Democrats] have been in power 
for so long. It’ll take decades before they learn, before they can… yeah.” He trailed off and the 
others nodded their agreement, mumbling “it’s crazy” and “such a disgrace”. During the actual 
meeting, the representatives went over a motion put forward by the Local Party to simplify and 
shorten the information packages [handlingar] politicians were given by officials2. Mats read 
the headline and announced “We’ll vote yes to this, right?” in a tone of voice suggesting he did 
not anticipate any argument. Annika tentatively raised her hand and said: “You want to vote 
yes?” Gunilla and Mats nodded. Annika slowly told them that she had already voted no to the 
same motion in her city district committee. The group mockingly gasped, and a discussion 
ensued. “I think it’s dangerous to vote yes to something like this”, Annika said. “I want to 
choose for myself what I read. The risk is that the officials will choose what they think is 
important for us to know.” Participating on Zoom, another representative, Emma, chimed in, 
voice raspy from the laptop speakers: “They already do!”  
Here, Annika and those who agreed with her were wary of the power that officials had 
to choose what to include in the briefing material. They suspected that facts that would make 
the established political parties – especially the Social Democrats that had governed the city 
 
2 Prior to Municipal Council and Board meetings, the city management office (stadsledningskontoret), staffed 
by non-politically affiliated officials (tjänstemän), prepared information packages (handlingar) for politicians – 
documents that outlined the background and information required for politicians to make decisions regarding the 
topics to be discussed during Council and Board meetings. 
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for decades – look bad would be downplayed or not included at all. However, under the current 
system officials already had that power, as they prepared and conducted feasibility studies of 
various projects and reported the results to politicians, who then, based on that material, voted 
and made the decisions.  
 Not only were officials thought to try to promote other political parties, but they were 
also suspected of actively sabotaging for the SD in a way they did not work against other 
parties. This belief was made clear to me one day when Hampus, in charge of economics, told 
me about the difficulties he had in obtaining the model for resource distribution from the city 
management’s office last year. He told me that he had e-mailed them repeatedly but had been 
told that they did not have such a model, which he knew to be untrue; otherwise the city would 
not have given out any money (in social welfare benefits) that year. The situation was 
eventually resolved when Mats brought the matter to the municipal board chairman, who in 
turn talked to the officials in charge, and Hampus was finally given the information he needed. 
Having finished his story, he smiled ironically and told me that if I had asked the officials for 
it, I probably would have been given access immediately, but since he was from the SD, they 
withheld the information from him.  
Suspicions of corruption were, as we have just seen, usually centred on officials and 
state and municipal institutions. Also the media, however, was occasionally perceived as 
corrupt. For instance, discussing an article in the local newspaper about how the Liberal Party’s 
municipal commissioner in Centreville would be stepping down, Johan asked drily: “Is it even 
interesting?” (because, as I understood it, the party is so small and thus of little common 
interest). “They must have some friends at the paper”, Thomas pondered. “Like, ’we have to 
write about the Liberals now because we’re a liberal paper’.” The assumption was that the local 
newspaper wrote the article not because it was of public interest, but because the Liberal Party 
were thought to “have friends” there; that is, journalists who wanted to promote the party. As 
Johan put it on another occasion: “The left has governed for so long, so they have their own 
reporters in the media”. The journalists were thus believed to disregard their journalistic duty 
to be impartial.  
Whenever I asked about why officials or journalists would behave so poorly – why they 
were “corrupt”, in my interlocutors’ words – I usually received somewhat vague and dodging 
answers that nonetheless tended to focus either on the fact that the Social Democrats had ruled 
the city for so long, and thus had put sympathetic officials in charge in key positions, or that 
the officials or political parties simply did not have a good grasp on reality. When blame was 
shifted to the Social Democrats and I prodded further and asked why they were corrupt, I would 
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be met by scoffs: “sossarna is a power party”, i.e. would do anything to remain in power and 
were scared to lose it; or “the Left has no grasp of reality”, i.e., they were naive.  
 
Assumptions of naivety  
In September the Social Democrats put forward a motion in the Municipal Board to investigate 
the radical-nationalist milieu in Centreville, and Gunilla came back from the meeting in a huff. 
“There are, like, twenty-five Islamists for every nationalist”, she exclaimed. “And in a city 
where the criminals feel like they own the town… where you’ve got ethnic groups fighting 
with each other, we’re supposed to examine nationalism; people need to know this”. She 
thought resources would be better spent on countering Islamism. When Mats talked about the 
same motion on another occasion, he thought that the Social Democrats had put it forward to 
appease their Left party friends, who were believed to naively embrace multiculturalism and, 
with their purportedly skewed priorities, shun any association with the Right. In other words, 
Mats appeared to believe that there was something hidden going on – the motion was 
understood not in terms of simply different perspectives or priorities, but as something more 
sinister: a hidden deal between the power hungry Social Democrats and the naive, not-quite-
grasping-reality Left Party.  
The notion that the political left did not grasp ”reality” was indeed a recurring theme. 
Hampus put this succinctly one day when he had just read something in an “alternative” 
newspaper. I do not recall exactly what it was, but considering what was usually quoted to me, 
it was presumably either about benefit fraud or a violent crime committed by immigrants. Not 
knowing quite what to say, I commented: “That… sucks.” Hampus grinned and said: 
“Welcome to reality!”  
That made stop in my tracks. It occurred to me that Hampus perceived an almost 
ontological chasm between himself and his political opponents. What he perceived as “reality” 
was what, in his mind, it seemed, the Left could not – or would not – grasp. This sentiment was 
occasionally echoed by Gunilla, as well. It was approaching lunchtime one October day, and I 
popped my head into Gunilla’s office to ask if she was getting lunch. Not taking her eyes off 
the screen, she said she might have a lunch box in the freezer and added, unprompted, that she 
was working on motions about benefit fraud. “And, listen” – she scrolled down her document 
and quoted an article – “‘it’s commonly known that about half of all asylum seekers have 
multiple identities’. It’s completely mad!” I sauntered up to her desk, quizzical. “We’re so kind 
and dumb, we’re draining this country”, she continued.  
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Her assertion that “we [Sweden] are so kind and dumb” is noteworthy. Again, like 
Hampus, she was implicitly accusing the government of not understanding reality. However, 
she traced this lack of understanding to kindness. The ruling Left wanted to help so badly, so 
the argument goes, but they went about it the wrong way – their kindness blinded them to the 
“real” issues, to which only SD were privy; particularly excessive immigration and ensuing 
issues with unemployment, crime, national cohesion, and gender equality.  
Hampus’s, Gunilla’s, and other SD representatives’ repeated references to the Left as 
naive often came across like an infantilisation of their political opponents, presenting them as 
not really having grasped reality. They were like children, in that sense, and the SD were “the 
grown-ups in the room”, as Johan put it. Making small talk before a casual meeting with Mats 
and his political secretaries in City Hall, Johan told his colleagues and myself about a debate-
article suite taking place in his municipality. Apparently, the old Alliance parties had voted for 
an SD proposal, and the Left Party had written a debate article condemning the Alliance parties 
for thereby legitimising the SD. Johan complained that the Left party was attacking the SD 
with falsehoods and petty lies. “It’s so silly [tramsigt], it’s so incredibly silly right now”, Mats 
commented, voice seeping with frustration. Johan smiled wearily at me and said: “We’re the 
grown-ups in the room”.  
My interlocutors thus understood their own party as “the voice of reality” (which, 
incidentally, is in fact the slogan for the SD Women’s association [verklighetens röst]). Other 
political parties were believed to not understand, or not care about, what were really the 
principal issues facing the nation. I distinctly got the impression that my interlocutors felt that 
the SD was special; chosen, almost.  
Gunilla made this quite clear one day. The afternoon sun was peering through the blinds 
in her office and she was squinting at the computer screen as she checked the name of the 
podcast she had just recommended to me. In the latest episode, an EU parliamentarian from 
the SD was the guest, and Gunilla felt validated by what the MEP had said; something about 
the lack of societal security brought about by “mass immigration”.  
 “It’s a little ‘we told you so’… No-one dares to say this except for us. I just kind of got 
it confirmed, that I’m on the right path.” She smiled. “Politics is a bit like religion, don’t you 
think? It’s a little ‘Jesus will save me’…” She laughed. “No, but…” She trailed off.  
In part, she was clearly joking. Nonetheless, her invocation of “the right path” and 
“politics [being] a bit like religion” is striking. Peter Hervik suggests that neo-nationalists can 
be approached as “devoted actors” – people who are willing to make costly sacrifices to defend 
certain sacred values, in this case “the secular nation” (2021, 101). This seemed to be true for 
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Gunilla, as well. She, like many of her SD colleagues, regularly recounted deteriorating 
relationships with friends and family because of her political engagement. Some members told 
me that they, or someone they knew, had lost their jobs or struggled to find new ones because 
of their affiliation with the SD. Despite painful sacrifices, in other words, my interlocutors were 
still determined to do what they felt was their duty: defend “the nation” through activism in the 
SD; the only party who “really” understood the issues faced by the nation. This might be 
understood as a reinforcement of the antagonistic frontier outlined in Laclau’s theory – the 
more my interlocutors’ demands for strengthening and defending the nation were denied or 
ignored, the more entrenched the frontier between the SD and the deniers of those demands 
became. More on this later.  
 
Suspicion of bias 
Not only state institutions or political parties were mistrusted, but also the media, maybe even 
more so. On several occasions, I was reminded by my interlocutors of a poll that showed that 
a majority of Scandinavian journalists were left-wing-sympathisers.  
 One windy August day, Gunilla, Mats and I were going out to lunch with a visiting SD 
member of Parliament (MP), Karl. On our way to lunch, weaving between buses and 
pedestrians, I explained my research project to Karl and mentioned that I was particularly 
interested in public trust, especially in the media. Mats, walking beside us, said that he was all 
for public service media but he wanted to cut about 90% of it. He wanted “news, not play- and 
dance programs… and I love sports, but maybe public service should just report on the game, 
and you should pay to watch it.” A few beats later, he added: “free and independent media only 
works when you let it be free… state TV is what they had in the Soviet Union and the DDR.”  
 Karl and Mats agreed that public service was fine as long as it only reported impartial, 
independent news. Karl mentioned imbalance in journalists’ political sympathies, referring to 
a poll that came out recently that showed that a majority of reporters were left-wing 
sympathisers. “Then they’re not impartial”, he concluded grimly. As an example, he told me 
that the right-of-centre KD [Kristdemokraterna, the Christian Democrats] were given much 
less coverage time than what was given to the leftist party Fi [Feministiskt Initiativ, Feminist 
Initiative] before the last election. This was despite the fact that the latter were below the 4%-
bar of received votes and thus were not even represented in Parliament.  
 A little while later, digging into our hearty, traditional Swedish lunches, the discussion 
turned to the USA and the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement. Mats, increasingly irritated 
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by his own story, related how a white guy tried to help his trans friend but got beaten up by 
BLM. “Where do you read about that in Sweden? Nowhere! Not a single paragraph!” He fumed 
that “it just doesn’t fit into the narrative”, referring to what he regarded as the hegemonic 
narrative in Swedish media’s reporting, which, in his view, always represented the BLM in a 
positive light. Karl nodded gravely, and they agreed that they just wanted balanced news where 
both sides of the story are given equal and impartial coverage.  
Mats’s references to “the narrative” and his assertion that “state-TV is what they had in 
the [authoritarian] DDR” indicates a view that free speech is compromised and opinions 
dictated by the state. Furthermore, Mats’s and Karl’s comments shed light on how they do not 
feel represented by “the narrative”; they do not feel that the way they perceive reality is being 
treated on an equal basis with competing political views of reality. This reveals a fundamental, 
ontological disagreement over the nature of reality and truth, and the power inherent in the 
ability of what they believed to be “the elite”, i.e., the detested Left, to set the agenda.  
 Anders, another MP whom I talked to earlier that year about public service media, on 
the other hand, expressed concern over the diminishing public trust in the media. His suggested 
course of action nonetheless ended up in the same place. He said that it is mostly the older 
generation that listens to and watches public service media; the younger generation trusts it 
less and less, and: “If you don’t do anything about it now it’s just going to get worse”. That is 
why the SD invited representatives from SVT and UR (the state TV-channel and radio station) 
to Parliament for a hearing, he explained – to ensure objectivity so that more people will trust 
their services more. “So really, you want to strengthen trust in public service?” I asked, a little 
surprised. He nodded.  
 In fact, Anders is rather typical in his support for public service media. Several SD 
representatives, when asked, said that they were not after dismantling public service media or 
feeding public mistrust; rather the opposite. However, more casual comments and discussions 
revealed a deep-seated, wide-ranging, and seemingly antagonistic mistrust. I became aware of 
this during a lecture on the party’s communication plan for aspiring SD-politicians. There were 
about 20 people in the large room, many of them hurriedly taking notes between sips of coffee 
while Annika and Jens (regional representative for the SD) held a presentation. The topic was 
on how to handle journalists and the media, and Mats, having raised his hand, was saying: 
“Journalists aren’t out enemies, it’s super important to remember that”. Benjamin, Annika’s 
stand-in on her district committee, raised his hand. “I’m thinking journalists who make their 
money by twisting the truth and lying-” he started. Mats shot in “Absolutely”, and Benjamin 
continued: “-aren’t they the enemy of the people?” Mats replied thoughtfully: “I think it’s a 
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situation where we have to see the media as a means to reach out. Then, of course, there will 
always be particular journalists you don’t like. We won’t be judged in the same way as other 
parties, you have to be aware of that… we don’t get away with the same things but they’re still 
not our enemies.”  
 Benjamin, still rather new as a politician, formulated his mistrust in more polarised 
terms (“enemy of the people”) than Mats, who was a political veteran of ten years and well-
versed in diplomatic discourse. Nevertheless, Mats’s assertion that the SD will not “get away 
with the same things [as other parties]” and his agreement that there are journalists who “make 
their money by twisting the truth and lying”, indicate that his relationship to journalists was 
still rather antagonistic and he did not trust their objectivity.  
 Another event, where the SD representatives in City Hall discussed an article about 
Gunilla, may illustrate this antagonism further. I was about to leave City Hall for the day when 
I heard Gunilla opening the door to her office down the hall and spluttering about the call she 
just received from a journalist at a leftist, anti-racist journal. She thought she handled herself 
quite well in the interview under the circumstances but was angry that the journalist had wanted 
to smear her and dug up articles she had shared years ago on social media by apparently 
extreme-right sources. She thought, and the others agreed, that it was just another attempt by 
the Left to make something out of nothing and discredit the party.  
 The next day was an unusually sunny Thursday, and with a visiting Annika we all 
decided to go out for lunch. Sitting crouched under a low ceiling in a nearby Thai restaurant 
the conversation drifted between weekend plans to music taste and good bars, and we bonded 
over bars we liked and disliked and we laughed at each other’s bad taste in music. Suddenly, 
Gunilla got a notification and whipped out her phone, exclaiming that the article was out; the 
article being the one she was interviewed for on the phone the previous day. We all dug up our 
phones and skimmed the article, which claimed the material she had shared was anti-Semitic 
and homophobic. Gunilla seemed shaken but repeated that she was not worried and everyone 
agreed that the whole thing was just nonsense. They stressed that if you actually read the 
articles she had shared it was really nothing to fuss about, but that the sources themselves were 
in fact questionable. On the way back to City Hall, they all joked in sarcastic tones about the 
leftist media. “I’m an Islamophobe, it says so in the local paper”, Thomas said ironically, and  
“everything to the right of that journal is right-wing extreme, isn’t it”, Hampus chimed in, 
rolling his eyes. Mats joked that he did not want Gunilla to walk beside him because he did not 
want to be seen in a picture with her. Gunilla laughed along with the jokes but said, albeit 
chirpily, that she already felt bad and that they should stop it.  
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The article was referred to by my interlocutors as “troll activity”, the “death rattles of 
the Left; the only way to get rid of us is to smear us”, and “making something out of nothing”. 
Such comments point to the perception that, since the journal had a well-known leftist slant, 
the article was politically motivated and thus should be understood as a desperate attack, rather 
than a legitimate critique. Indeed, such comments were quite common. “[The journal] is 
hunting faults with us”, Annika said once during an Open House at the party office. “That’s 
one of their main goals. No-one hunts others as much as they hunt us… it’s a leftist 
organisation. But it was founded to audit politicians and others.”  
 “That’s opinion registration”, Gunilla said (in reference to Annika’s suggestion that the 
journal “hunts faults” with them).  
 “Kind of Stasi!” one member added.  
Another member raised his hand and said: “The bigger we get, the more excited [the 
media] will get and try to look at everything we do. They’ll get even more desperate to find 
something to try and smear us with, even more desperate, even uglier”.  
The media was, in other words, believed to be biased against the SD. As shown in the 
ethnographic vignette in the beginning of this chapter, Mats explained the media’s purported 
smear-campaign of the SD with three factors; that they get clicks if they write scandals about 
them, the fact that the party cannot shake off its past (i.e., their Nazi roots), and third, other 
parties’ fear of losing power and means to the SD.  
However, just as other political parties were perceived as naive, so was the media, on 
occasion. During a lecture for members by visiting MP Anders, he talked about the state of the 
country and the increase of criminal activity, and said: “Not everything is about covering things 
up, even if that’s probably a big part of it. A lot of it’s probably about the fact that you can’t 
believe it’s really like this; you can’t see what it’s really like.” It was unspecified if the 
comment was directed at the media or the government, but as it is the media’s job to investigate 
and hold the government accountable, it is regardless a condemnation of the media’s 
capabilities. In contrast, the SD is celebrated as the voice of reason; the only ones who can see 
the world for what it really is.  
Above, I have highlighted some of the ways the SD representatives I studied mistrust 
the media and state and municipal institutions. Now, let us turn to a consideration of how we 




We have seen that in SD’s worldview, officials, other political parties, and mainstream and 
public service media were understood as biased and naive. They were believed to be corrupt 
and afraid of losing their own power and means to the SD, representing the Swedish people, as 
opposed to the elite, dominated by the Left. But there was also, crucially, a difference in degree 
of (mis)trust.  
Gunilla often lamented a particular mainstream newspaper for being left-leaning and 
biased against the SD, but one day texted me the link to a debate article she had written and 
gotten published in that paper. She commented: “nice preamble he [the journalist] wrote 
considering that [the journalist] from [the paper] doesn’t like us. But as responsible for 
publishing debate articles he’s neutral and professional”. The paragraph in question was simply 
an excerpt from her debate article. On another occasion, Jens commended a report from a 
university, of which my interlocutors were usually critical, saying: “We had a presentation by 
the SOM-institute, they do very good surveys of what people think about different things”. 
Furthermore, Hampus, usually so suspicious of official statistics, was looking over some 
numbers from the city management’s office regarding a motion to increase the wages of health 
care personnel during the covid-19 pandemic. He commented: “these numbers can’t be that 
off.”  
Clearly, then, mistrust, while pervasive, was not applied equally in every situation or 
in equal amounts. Some actors and sources, even if they were generally dismissed as 
untrustworthy, were in certain situations nonetheless trusted to a larger extent than in others. 
How are we to understand these variations? 
Mistrust has by some scholars been viewed as a reduction of complexity (Hardin in 
Mühlfried 2019), but as Mühlfried argues and as we can see in the above examples, it clearly 
entails a whole lot of work – each situation was evaluated separately. I add to his theory the 
suggestion that, for the SD, the decisive axis that decided someone’s or something’s 
trustworthiness was its perceived proximity to one’s own political standpoint. In Laclau’s 
terms, we might say that the clearer the source’s or the actor’s position in regards to the 
antagonistic frontier (“with” or “against” “us, the people”), the easier to evaluate its 
trustworthiness, or lack thereof.  
Nonetheless, a caveat is called for in order to account for occasions where normally 
mistrusted actors were (to an extent) trusted anyway. Here, I suggest that perceived 
transparency lessened but did not entirely remove mistrust. In other words, for the SD, the 
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closer a source or an actor was perceived to be to their own position on the political spectrum, 
the more it was trusted, with perceived transparency as a mitigating factor. I return to this 
shortly.   
Below, I will illustrate this argument further, transitioning from the subject of 
mistrusted to trusted sources, and discuss the ambivalence experienced by the SD 
representatives I studied when a source felt trustworthy to them, but they were told it was racist 
and thus not to be trusted. Drawing on Laclau and Mühlfried, I will then suggest that such 
ambivalence may be a strategy on the SD’s part, and that their mistrust is both overt and covert, 
and an expression of antagonism.  
As we have seen, my interlocutors were quick to dismiss the journal that first published 
the articles about Gunilla, as well as most mainstream and public service news outlets. 
Crucially, the stated reason for this dismissal was often explicitly that these sources were 
perceived as left-leaning, and thus either naive or afraid of losing their own power, and so had 
incentives to work against the SD, because the party was growing rapidly. The swiftness with 
which the journal that published the article about Gunilla was dismissed suggests that more or 
less radical mistrust (the idea that an actor or a source could not be trusted, period) was at work. 
Gunilla had barely hung up the phone with the reporter before complaining about his bias. The 
journal was perceived as being on the opposite side of the political spectrum, and there was 
seemingly no way it could be trusted, period.  
As we have also seen, however, this was not always the case. Most of the time, sources 
and actors were evaluated continuously and separately in different situations. For example, the 
journalist that Gunilla trusted with her debate article worked for a moderately leftist newspaper; 
the university from which the report that Jens trusted came from was believed to be infused 
with neo-Marxists; and the city management’s office was thought to be saturated with corrupt 
officials. In terms of my argument, all those actors were perceived as being on the opposite end 
of the political spectrum from the SD. Why, then, were these sources trusted anyway in these 
particular circumstances?  
A tentative answer might be that it was not so much the sources that were trusted, but 
the particular materials – the debate article, the report, the numbers. It might be suggested that 
those specific products resulted from fairly transparent processes: the journalist could not have 
changed anything in the debate article without consulting its authors, and both the university 
and the city management’s office published long methodological sections. Additionally, it 
could be argued that the statements my interlocutors made when declaring their trust still did 
not throw caution to the wind. Gunilla specified the particular instance in which the journalist 
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was neutral and professional (arguably minimal requirements for a reporter), Jens also 
specified the institute’s good work on specifically “report[s] about what people think about 
different things”, and Hampus’s emphasis on how the numbers could not be “that off” suggests 
a lingering suspicion that they may still be somewhat off. Trust and mistrust can, as Mühlfried 
reminds us, exist simultaneously, on different levels.  
Nonetheless, the field of explicitly trustworthy sources was rather thin, ambiguous, and 
disputed. Most of my interlocutors read both mainstream media and Swedish “alternative 
media”, which was believed to be more impartial and report both sides of the issues. However, 
these “alternative” sources were subject to a great deal of uncertainty, ambiguity, and 
ambivalence. For instance, a fairly common complaint was that many of these alternative 
sources had similar names – e.g., Nya Tider, Fria Tider, Samtiden – but their profiles and 
contents were different, and some of them were “OK” – that is, trustworthy – and others were 
not, for various reasons that seemed opaque and arbitrary to many of my interlocutors.  
One September evening in City Hall, the SD politicians had just finished a meeting 
with the SD’s Municipal Council representatives about the upcoming MC meeting. People 
were milling about clearing cups and plates and talking amongst themselves. I was just 
finishing writing a fieldnote and when I looked up I noticed Gunilla and Jens discussing news 
sites, with Annika offering the occasional comment.  
 Gunilla suggested the party board should make a list with approved news sites.  
 “’Samtiden’ is ours [i.e., funded by or run by SD sympathisers]”, Annika said.  
 “Are you sure? I haven’t heard that”, Gunilla mused, and added: “This is really bloody 
tricky when you don’t know for sure.”  
 They listed some names of “alternative” news sites: Nyheter24, Samtiden, Nya Tider, 
Fria Tider, discussing which ones were and were not “okay”.  
 “I really want people to have clear lists so that they don’t make the same mistake I did”, 
Gunilla said.  
 Jens googled Samtiden and informed us that it was founded in 1948 “so it’s probably 
not ours”.  
 Gunilla, still on her “mistake”, exclaimed: “I didn’t have any bloody idea that Nya Tider 
was a Nazi paper, I had no idea!”  
The “mistake” Gunilla referred to was the subject of the article about her, having shared 
material from extreme-right sources. Gunilla’s desire to have “clear lists” of approved sites 
was an indication that she herself did not feel confident to judge which sites were acceptable; 
that is, not having an affinity with right-wing extremism.  
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 This becomes even more interesting when we consider an event only a few weeks later, 
during the aforementioned lecture on the communication plan with prospective SD-politicians. 
Having told the audience about her experiences surrounding the article about her, Gunilla 
concluded her brief lecture by mournfully saying: “From what I know today, I barely dare share 
anything except regular newspapers, because they [alternative media, e.g., Nya Tider/Fria 
Tider/Samtiden] all sound so alike… so if you’re not sure, just please, don’t [share].”  
 Annika took over, soberly summarising: “So, what Gunilla did wrong here: she shared 
stuff by senders she didn’t know. Some people want a list, but you can’t do that, you can’t give 
a list of ‘this is OK and this isn’t’, it fluctuates.”  
 Mats, the same night, expressed something similar when he said: “I’m never going to 
tell you what is and isn’t okay [to share on social media], because you kind of have to sense 
that yourselves. But you share mass media, that’s what you do as an SD-representative. Then 
of course you can think that Expressen is a goddamn shit paper… I’ll never come and say ‘you 
can’t think this or that’.”  
Nevertheless, when a member asked: “Is Ingrid Carlqvist okay [to share material 
from]?”, Gunilla shook her head3. “It’s not okay, you’ll be kicked out head-first if you end up 
in a commission or something and they find it, so I’m afraid not.” Evidently, then, there was 
still an element of top-down decision-making; of saying “this is OK and this is not”.  
 These examples show us the uncertainty many of my interlocutors experienced 
regarding “alternative media” – as a rule, they trusted such sources more than mainstream 
media, in so far as they believed the “alternative” sources to be more impartial. However, some 
of those same news sites were labelled “racist”, “right-wing extreme”, “anti-Semitic” by both 
the party leadership and non-SD commentators. That meant that members felt they should not 
trust such sources – but still felt that they were the most trustworthy, compared to the 
mainstream. The problem was that to my informants the trustworthiness of sources often 
seemed arbitrary, and I often spotted them reading one or more of the sources deemed 
unacceptable.  
Annika had one such discussion at the party office with two female members during a 
meeting about church politics. They were going over how to reach out with their messages in 
the media, and the discussion turned to “OK” and “not OK” sources. “I have to say, I read Nya 
 
3 Ingrid Carlqvist is a controversial journalist and author, popular in radical right-circles. She has made 
numerous Islamophobic and antisemitic remarks on Twitter and in interviews (Poohl 2021). 
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Tider every week and that’s one of the most entertaining things I do”, one of the women said, 
smiling.  
 “Well, reading it is one thing, but contributing is another. The party board has decided 
it’s racist”, Annika said.  
 “It’s not racist, I don’t think”, the woman countered, looking a little hurt.  
 Mats probably summarised it the most clearly when he, during a lecture for members, 
said: “…it’s so easy to see something in your feed that you think sounds pretty sensible but 
turns out to be from a bad source.”  
 
Mistrust and antagonism 
Following the idea that the closer a source is perceived to be to one’s own political position, 
the more it can be trusted, then it would follow that “alternative media” should be trusted the 
most by my interlocutors. To an extent, that seems to be the case – the content of articles by 
such sites was usually uncontroversial. In Mats’s words above, it “sounds pretty sensible”. 
However, the party board as well as non-SD-commentators judge those sites as “racist” – while 
still not offering any “clear lists”, only the occasional hint, of which sources were and were not 
acceptable, as “it fluctuates”.  
 Glancing back at Laclau (2005), we might consider if this is not a more or less conscious 
strategy on behalf of the party: too narrow boundaries around the common identity, and some 
demands will not be included in the chain of equivalence; too loose, and they will have nothing 
around which to unite and the chain of equivalence will dissolve. In our terms this means that 
if it had been too clear what sources were and were not acceptable and thus trustworthy, some 
members might have felt excluded, but if it had been too vague, they might have lost their sense 
of belonging or purpose.  
 Furthermore, keeping Laclau in mind, we might understand mistrust as a response to 
those that are believed not to have one’s best interests at heart; in this case, “the elite”, on the 
other side of the antagonistic frontier. In fact, such theories have indeed been put forward 
(Hardin in Ystanes 2011), about how only those whose interests are perceived as being 
incapsulated in one’s own may be trusted. However, I believe that while this may be an 
illuminating model for understanding the mistrust among the SD, it is not a sufficient one, for 
a few reasons. First, the alternative is not between two absolutes; trust or mistrust, 
encapsulating someone’s interests in one’s own or not. As Mühlfried shows, there are many 
grey areas – actors may be trusted in certain situations but not in others; that is, trust is 
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conditional, and trust and mistrust may co-exist simultaneously. We have seen this in how, for 
example, Gunilla generally mistrusts a newspaper and its journalists, but “as responsible for 
publishing debate articles he [a journalist] is neutral and professional”. Second, in my 
interlocutors’ own explanations, they often mistrust actors not because they believe them to 
not have their best interests at heart, but because they believe those actors to be naive and 
incompetent.  
 Finally, such an implicitly dichotomic understanding of trust or mistrust fails to account 
for the amount of work that my interlocutors put into gauging an actor’s trustworthiness. Here, 
Mühlfried’s analysis becomes particularly helpful. His notion that mistrust works on two 
levels, one overt and one covert, allows us to see how cost-intensive a mistrustful relationship 
is, as both levels must be maintained simultaneously. The surface level, the overt, is where 
interaction takes place, whereas the underground, covert level operates through the overt to 
gather information about the Other and evaluate their trustworthiness. In order for the status 
quo to be maintained, however, the covert, mistrustful level must not become apparent, 
because: “If mistrust does come to the surface, it may cause – or manifest – antagonism” 
(Mühlfried 2019, 43).  
 For our purposes, “manifest” is the keyword. As we have seen through Laclau’s theory 
on populist reason, antagonism is already present in my interlocutor’s relation to those they 
perceive as denying their demands, and in fact constitutes their party as “the people”. Through 
mistrust, this antagonism becomes manifest and expressed. But does it become overt?  
All this mistrust was somewhat surprising to me. I had, naturally, studied up on the SD 
before entering the field; I had followed articles about them in mainstream media, perused 
several books, and studied their website. Nonetheless, it took me several weeks in the field to 
begin to realise the extent of their mistrust. I also noticed that in interviews with reporters or in 
formal motions to the Municipal Board or Council, the SD representatives never brought up 
their concerns about the trustworthiness of the media or state/municipal institutions and 
officials. On social media, on the other hand, it was a different story. I have an abundance of 
fieldnotes noting examples of tweets and Facebook status updates expressing mistrust of 
journalists, newspapers, officials, and other political parties. Since those publications were 
public and open to anyone, this poses an interesting question: as anyone could see those posts 
and tweets, should the conveyed mistrust be considered overt? Or rather, as neither I nor anyone 
I know had read such publications, should it be considered covert?  
 The answer, I suspect, may be a little bit of both. My politician interlocutors probably 
knew that it was best to maintain an appearance of conviviality and not make their antagonistic 
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mistrust too manifest, in order to further their image of themselves as a political party like any 
other, while still, somewhat more covertly, maintaining a mistrustful approach. Many 
members, on the other hand – who usually were more direct in their comments, as well as in 
their tweets and status updates – may have been less concerned with maintaining the status 
quo, and may even have desired to make their antagonism apparent, perhaps out of frustration. 
Mistrust, then, could be considered an expression of an already existing antagonism.  
 
Conclusion 
On one of my last days in the field, I was chatting casually with Gunilla in her office. I was 
leaning on her standing desk, cupping my face in my hands, watching her work. I mentioned 
that I was leaving them soon, and she asked what I had learned after the months I had spent 
with them, and if I had changed opinion on anything. I thought for a moment, and then said 
that it had been striking to me how critical they were of, well, almost everything, and I supposed 
that it had made me a little more source-critical, too. She smiled and nodded approvingly. “Yes, 
it’s important to be critical”, she agreed.  
 In this chapter, we have seen how a suspicion of corruption and bias among the media, 
officials, and state and municipal institutions, was expressed in mistrust of the same. Not all 
actors were mistrusted equally and in every situation, however, showing the conditional nature 
of mistrust. Furthermore, sources believed to be close to one’s own political standpoint were 
generally trusted to a larger extent – even though a perception of transparency might be a 
mitigating factor. However, ambivalence set in among my interlocutors regarding sources 
whose content they thought was uncontroversial, yet the sources themselves were deemed 
unacceptable and untrustworthy by the party board and mainstream society, for what to SD 
members and representatives seemed arbitrary reasons. Drawing on Laclau, we might 
understand this ambivalence as a strategy to maintain a balance between a narrow and loose 
definition of the boundaries defining “the people”, so as to include as many demands as 
possible while still maintaining group cohesion. Reinforcing group cohesion, the 
representatives and members I studied directed their mistrust at those on the other side of the 
antagonistic frontier, in this case the political Left or the “elites”, thereby strengthening the 
division between them. Drawing on Mühlfried allowed us to see the cost-intensive work 
entailed in gauging an actor’s trustworthiness, and that allowing mistrust to come to the fore 
created or made the already present antagonism manifest and expressed.  
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In sum, then, we have seen mistrust through a prism of antagonism. However, in their 
own view, my interlocutors believed their mistrust to be a democratising attitude – “thinking 
for themselves”, giving “the people” a voice, contributing to a plurality of opinions, upsetting 
the status quo. This is a remarkably similar attitude to Mühlfried’s contention that “Democracy 
cannot exist without trust, but also not without mistrust” (Mühlfried 2019, 8). Adopting the 
perspective that mistrust serves to “keep[ing] a suspicious eye on the state”, it is easy to see 
why Gunilla commented “it’s important to be critical” and why my interlocutors valued 
independent thinking; for them, as for Mühlfried, mistrust was constructive, and contributed to 
a better, more equal society.  
 Having thus far gleaned a better understanding of the construction of the SD as “the 
people” (chapter 1), and the expression of antagonism through a deep and wide-ranging 
mistrust (present chapter), the question still remains: why is the populism of the SD expressed 
particularly in nationalistic and chauvinist terms? Why is the demand for exclusionary 
nationalism privileged in being the demand under which other demands are subsumed? This 





Chapter 3  
National Belonging and “The Nation” as Empty Signifier   
 
Introduction 
So far in this thesis we have drawn on Laclau’s theory on populist reason to better understand 
how the SD’s constitutes itself as “the people”, and how this group is constituted through, 
among other things, antagonism. We have also seen how this antagonism is reflected in high 
levels of mistrust. It is now time to have a closer look at what I would suggest is the empty 
signifier around which all other demands coalesce (and which, in turn, constitutes them): “the 
nation”. I argue that the foundational value placed on the nation can be seen through my 
interlocutors’ welfare chauvinism: they believe that immigrants claim welfare that should be 
reserved for deserving Swedes. This assumption is, as we shall see, generally based on ethnic 
stereotypes and antagonisms, and is indicative of an exclusionary nationalism. The prevalence 
of the logic of welfare chauvinism and ethnic boundary making leads me to suggest that in the 
SD’s chain of equivalence, “the nation” serves as an empty signifier, but as a floating signifier 
in Swedish society at large. A floating signifier is, as we recall from chapter 1, a contested 
signifier. If an internal antagonistic frontier is not stable, if competing populist projects lay 
claims on an empty signifier, it is filled with various, contested meaning. It thus becomes a 
floating signifier.  
 In this chapter, I will briefly review some theories of nationalism, before turning to an 
ethnographic account of my interlocutors’ welfare chauvinism. I will show how it is based on 
primarily ethnic understandings of belonging, framed in nationalist terms, and discuss how the 
symbol of nationalism encompasses – and constitutes – other demands. I will argue that “the 
nation” acts as an empty signifier in crystallising the SD’s identification with “the people”. The 
vast majority of my interlocutors’ demands were filtered through the lens of “the nation”, 
deciding which demands could be incorporated into the chain of equivalence that constitutes 
the SD, as well as shaping those demands.  
 
Nationalism in anthropology 
Definitions of the concept of nationalism are both numerous and vague. Some scholars call it 
an ideology (Smith 2001, 9), others view it more akin to kinship or religion (Anderson 2016, 
5), yet others are reluctant to define it at all and prefer to classify core elements (Dryzek, Honig, 
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and Phillips 2008). In this brief overview, I will outline Benedict Anderson’s (2016) and Ernest 
Gellner’s (2010) ideas on the emergence of the idea of the nation, and consider ethnic and civic 
strands of nationalism and how they are conceptualised today.  
 Let us start with the emergence of the idea of the nation. Benedict Anderson and Ernest 
Gellner, arguably two of the most prominent authors on nationalism, both agree that the nation 
can be understood as an imagined community, and a fairly recent one at that (despite nationalist 
claims that the nation is an ancient, primordial entity). It is an imagined community because 
most people will never hear about or meet most of their fellow countrymen, but the community 
– while imagined – is not any less real because of it (Anderson 2016, 6). Anderson further 
argues that certain ideas had to die out for the idea of the nation to take hold. For instance, 
religious explanations for the human condition lost much of their potency as religion became 
less institutionally entrenched in the 19th century. Additionally, where previously history was 
imagined as the will of God, people began viewing “history as an endless chain of cause and 
effect” (Anderson 2016, 23). Finally, the idea of the nation became popularised primarily 
through print-capitalism; as vernacular languages took the place of Latin and the printing press 
was invented, literacy in the population increased and people began reading about people like 
themselves in their own language.  
Gellner (2010), on the other hand, suggests that nationalism came about through the 
industrial revolution and the education system. He argues that industrial society is, as opposed 
to agrarian societies, constantly changing and mobile – occupations are rarely passed from 
parents to their children, and people often change careers or jobs several times in their lifetimes. 
A consequence of this is that education must be standardised; a mobile work market requires 
that people share literacy and idioms that can be transmitted from one field to another without 
much loss. A standardised and general education ensures this. Specialisation occurs in the later 
educational stage. This standardised and general base education can only be managed by the 
state, which has a vested interest in producing productive citizens. Importantly, such an 
education, so intimately tied to the state, also took place within, and reproduced, a national 
culture.  
 Moreover, it has been common to differentiate between two strands of nationalism: 
civic and ethnic (Zubrzycki 2002). The civic strand is often attributed to Enlightenment ideas 
and views national belonging as a contractual, liberal idea for which origin, religion, ethnicity 
etc., are irrelevant. The ethnic strand, however, usually attributed to Johann Gottfried Herder, 
is more concerned with genealogy and race, the “blood and soil”-ideology that was taken to its 
extreme, xenophobic, genocidal logic by the Nazis.  
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 These strands are perhaps best understood as ideal types, and it would presumably be 
difficult to find any of them in a pure form in today’s political landscape. While a civic 
nationalism could be potentially inclusive, scholars of nationalism rather tend to focus on 
exclusionary, radical forms (again, ideal types) of nationalism and distinguish between cultural, 
ethnic, and racial nationalism (Fardan 2020). All are exclusionary, but not necessarily ethnic 
or racial. Briefly, racial nationalism builds on the idea that “race” is the fundamental criterion 
for national belonging, much like the Nazis’ ideology. It usually considers Jews as the ultimate 
enemy. Ethnic nationalism holds that ethnicity and “race”, understood as inherent, 
hierarchically defined biological differences, are important aspects of identity, but it aspires to 
separateness rather than purity: all ethnicities have equal value, but should exist and develop 
separately. Finally, cultural nationalism is arguably the most mainstream and least radical 
strand. It is exclusionary on cultural rather than ethnic or racial grounds, which means that in 
theory, foreigners can be fully accepted into national belonging if they give up their old culture 
and adopt the natives’. Cultural nationalism as a rule holds more pro-Israel views, but is highly 
sceptical of Islam and Muslims (Fardan 2020). While my aim is not to attempt to define the 
SD, I believe it is fair to say that they belong roughly somewhere between ethnic and cultural 
nationalism, as I will seek to illustrate below.  
Another, somewhat related, concept in need of clarification is welfare chauvinism. 
Political scientist Cas Mudde has defined it thus: “The main distinctive feature of the socio-
economic policy of all [extreme-right] parties is welfare chauvinism: that is, they believe that 
the fruits of the national economy should first and foremost (if not exclusively) come to the 
benefit of their ‘own people’… also that the state should protect certain sectors of the ‘native 
economy’ against foreign competition” (2000, 174-175). Leaving aside the question of whether 
the SD is “extreme-right”, their politics is quite clearly welfare chauvinist, as I will demonstrate 
below.   
 
Welfare chauvinism 
Annika was talking to me about healthcare one day, and said: “At some point citizenship has 
to be prioritised in health care”. She explained how immigrants get much more free health care 
than Swedes. “Dental care, for example… Where a Swede might pay eleven out of thirty 
thousand kronor, an immigrant might only have to pay fifty kronor.”  
 A similar sentiment was repeated often and by more or less all of my interlocutors. It 
was commonly believed that immigrants’ purported inability (or unwillingness) to pay their 
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own way was grounded in their desire to “get everything for free”. That is why the SD wanted 
the Swedish government to implement stricter measures and “demand something in return” – 
particularly that immigrants should partake in the job market.  
 Gunilla, among others, returned to this issue regularly. On numerous occasions, she 
sent me several links from alternative media sites that reported on immigrants who had 
scammed their welfare office by having multiple fake identities, or claiming benefits for 
children with a fake disability, or by any number of scams. One day I was hanging out in her 
office in City Hall, curled up in her armchair and watching her work. In between writing on a 
motion for the municipal council, she, unprompted, started talking about benefit fraud. She 
said that Sweden is gullible and naive. “We’re a humanitarian superpower, but one day the 
money’s going to run out if we give away too much”, she said. She wanted to give benefits to 
those who have worked for a while, but not the newly arrived. “There can be super high 
demands on a Swede who gets ill and who’s worked and worked, but the money just goes to 
people who aren’t born here.” She shook her head. All this cheating, she concluded, punishes 
people who really do need help. “If we want to protect the good ones we need to remove the 
bad ones. It’s like a bowl of fruit, if you let one bad one stay the rest go bad, too.” She thought 
people would get their act together if they knew they would not get any benefits next year, and 
compared the “mass immigration” to a coffee filter: you will not get a flow if you keep pouring 
in too much so it floods.  
In Gunilla’s comments there are two salient dividing lines: between ”Swedes” and those 
who “aren’t born here”, and those who “deserve” help and those who cheat. While not entirely 
explicit, the two fault lines seem to overlap: those who “aren’t born here” were invariably the 
ones she brought up as examples of cheaters. I rarely, if ever, heard examples of “Swedes” who 
cheated their way to receiving benefits. Gunilla once sighed: “We think ‘can we have three 
kids, do we have a house and a good job?’ and so on… they [immigrants] don’t think like that, 
‘it’ll work out somehow anyway’.”  
If ethnic membership was usually only implied, an explicit criterion for deserving 
welfare was the maxim “do your duty, claim your rights”, often repeated by Mats. Doing one’s 
duty meant, above all, having a job and paying taxes. This was put concisely by Hampus, who 
said: “I don’t mind people coming here, I mind them coming here and not working.” A fairly 
common topic of conversation was the complaint that (ethnically Swedish) working, middle-
class families were moving out of the country’s largest cities to neighbouring municipalities, 
leaving the economically “draining” immigrants to be the burden of the tax-paying inhabitants 
that were left. Urban municipalities were thus thought to be struggling economically because 
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of immigrants who allegedly had no interest in working and paying taxes, but wanted to coast 
on generous welfare benefits. There was, in fact, a rumour going around that I heard repeated 
with disdain on several occasions, that said that there were brochures circulating in refugee 
camps, outlining various European countries’ welfare policies, and that migrants picked the 
country with the most generous benefits.  
Nonetheless, working and paying taxes – while stated as the most important criterion 
for deserving access to welfare – was not enough to be considered a full member of the nation, 
and thus deemed deserving of welfare. Mats made this clear while Johan and I was talking to 
him in Johan’s office one day. Their conversation was originally about how PM Löfvén had 
said that immigration is connected to criminality (Zangana 2020), but soon turned to a lament 
about the Social Democrats’ integration policies. “For ten years, longer, they’ve taken away 
everything Swedish; in Sweden you don’t have to greet people, you can have an interpreter for 
life… what are you supposed to be integrated into?” Mats asked rhetorically, his voice tense 
with frustration. Jobs are great, he continued, but will not solve the integration issue. “An Iraqi 
with a web company who just talks to other Iraqis and makes money, that’s great, having a job 
and not being a weight on society, but it’s not integration.”  
Testing the hypothesis that “the problem of immigration” was that immigrants did not 
work, I asked Gunilla a few days later if immigration would be a problem if the country had 
infinite money. She looked at me with something resembling pity. “It’s about the fact that we 
haven’t made any demands [of immigrants]”, she said. “People haven’t adapted to Swedish 
customs, and no amount of money in the world could fix that. We’d end up with parallel 
societies.”  
 I asked if that was necessarily bad; if we had had infinite money, would it matter? She 
thought it would. “How then could we still be one country? And people still need to follow 
Swedish laws, and it’d be super weird if we had some girls who had to wear these cloths and 
be circumcised, and not others… it’s not nice to these girls who’ve ended up in trouble.”  
 Having a job as an immigrant, then, helped their status in the eyes of the SD, but was 
clearly not enough to be fully accepted and thus deserve welfare. As evinced in the idea of 
parallel societies, immigrants were also expected to adopt, or at least conform to, Swedish 
customs, pointing to cultural nationalism and a drive towards cultural homogeneity. 
What, then, does that mean? What does it mean for these SD representatives to be 
“Swedish”? Who did they consider as belonging to the nation?  
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Who belongs to the nation?  
“Belonging” is a rather vague concept, so let us first attempt to clarify it. “Belonging”, writes 
Yuval-Davis, “is about emotional attachment, about ‘feeling at home’ and… about feeling 
‘safe’… Belonging tends to be naturalised and becomes articulated and politicised only when 
it is threatened in some way” (2006, 2-3). Tine Gammeltoft uses the term to capture “the sense 
of attachment that people… articulated when describing the ties of mutuality that bound them 
together with others and into larger social communities” (2014, 31). Joanna Pfaff-Czarnecka  
(2011) introduces a distinction between “belonging with” and “belonging to”, where the former 
refers to “togetherness”, i.e., a collective belonging. The latter refers to the individual’s relation 
to a collective. This distinction makes it possible to study not only “group dynamics geared at 
maintaining the collective status quo”, but also “an individual’s embeddedness in a collective” 
(Pfaff-Czarnecka 2011, 3). When I use the term “belonging” here, I have both in mind, as my 
interlocutors’ own embeddedness in a (national) collective was implicitly connected to their 
perception of group dynamics – their idea of “Swedishness” seemed to be defined partly 
through what they believed it was not. I return to this below.  
Interestingly, I never heard my interlocutors talk explicitly about belonging, but it was 
implicitly ever-present. I could glean it in how they talked about, for instance, language 
learning, cultural practices, or values – in particular how immigrants did not conform to any of 
those. In an unstructured interview with Mats, for example, he told me that he thought the 
debate was skewed concerning who is “Swedish”; he said that there are different ethnic and 
legal definitions. “The Sami are Sami, for instance, otherwise they’d be called Swedes. But of 
course they can be Swedish citizens”, he concluded.  
In all its brevity, Mats’s comment elucidates a central question, always on the tip of my 
interlocutors’ tongues, as it were: who belongs to the nation? Mats here makes a distinction 
between being a citizen and a “Swede”, thereby implying that being a Swedish citizen does not 
necessarily make one a “Swede”.  
 Similarly, Gunilla once said, apropos health care, that midwives have been receiving 
an increasing number of threats from new fathers over the past five years. “And that’s not 
Swedish dads”, she said. “It’s not in our nature to threaten personnel.” Or, talking about 
Swedish citizens who had fought for IS and then returned to Sweden, she said: “Even if it says 
[in the papers] that they’re Swedes, they’re not really Swedes.”  
 When she made such comments, she was clearly not referring to Swedish citizenship, 
especially in the latter example. What, then, made her so sure those people were not “Swedes”? 
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Legally speaking, anyone with a Swedish citizenship is Swedish. A civic nationalism would 
have left it at that. Yet, another factor thus clearly mattered for both Mats and Gunilla: ethnicity.  
Let us pause briefly here to consider the term “ethnicity”, and how it relates to “race”, 
as both are notoriously equivocal concepts. Eriksen (2010) clarifies that ethnicity in 
anthropology is concerned with relations between people, where social differences are made 
relevant, a topic to which I return below. However, he notes that “ethnicity”, since the mid-
eighteenth century, has taken on some racial characteristics so there is some confusion as to 
how the terms are to be distinguished. Nevertheless, “race” – which Eriksen puts in quotation 
marks to point out that it is not a scientific term (2010, 5) – refers to purported biological 
differences which are believed to be linked with personality. This, he points out, has of course 
been disproven, hence the quotation marks.  
To complicate matters further, many scholars have suggested that racism has come to 
centre more around culture than “race”, engendering a “cultural racism”. According to 
Marianne Gullestad, “’culture’ now replaces ‘race’ in the rhetoric of the political right. 
According to these ideas, discrimination is increasingly justified by the existence of 
irreconcilable cultural differences rather than by hierarchical ‘races’” (2002, 59-60). Certain 
traits are nonetheless indiscriminately ascribed to entire groups. Insofar as that is a condition 
of racism, my interlocutors could on occasion be said to make culturally racist remarks, for 
example Johan’s comment about how immigrants need to be taught that “you can’t beat your 
kids, your wife has the same rights as you, you can’t push her from a balcony… I’m guessing 
that there must be some rules that say ‘those infidel Europeans, we won’t greet them, we’ll 
trick them’ – that part of the culture you have to put away. Or raping a girl because she’s not 
wearing a veil, that culture doesn’t fit in here.” 
Mats once tried to specify, when the question arose during an Open House with SD 
members, that “ethnically Swedish” means being born in Sweden by two Swedish-born 
parents. The question then arises: could Gunilla in her assertions know for sure that the new 
fathers who threatened midwives, or the returning IS-fighters, were not “born in Sweden by 
two Swedish-born parents?” It seems more likely that she made her assumptions based on 
ethnic stereotypes and, presumably, somatic and linguistic markers – perhaps the names or 
pictures of the alleged perpetrators in newspaper articles did not “look” or “sound” “Swedish”.  
 Lest it seems like we are approaching biological racism, I should point out that my 
interlocutors firmly believed that non-European adopted children were still “Swedes”. This 
was never explicitly explained to me, but it came up when Annika and Gunilla were talking 
about a neo-Nazi group, the Nordic Resistance Movement (NRM). “We’re drawing a little in 
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the same direction”, Gunilla said, “but we’d never even dream… they’re saying that adopted 
kids aren’t Swedish!” She shook her head incredulously. “Yeah”, Annika scoffed, “they’re 
Holocaust deniers.”  
The contradiction is clear: if a person is “ethnically Swedish” if they are born in Sweden 
by two Swedish-born parents, like Mats said, then how could adopted non-European children 
be “Swedish”? Presumably, then, culture plays a large part in my interlocutors’ understandings 
of belonging – adopted children are socialised into “Swedishness” by their adopted parents. 
Being thought to share the majority culture was, it seemed, a qualification for belonging. The 
above examples could be interpreted thus: if it is a Swedish cultural norm to avoid conflict, the 
new fathers who threaten midwives could be believed to ascribe to different cultural norms; 
and if the values that IS stands for are anathema to Swedish cultural norms, then fighting for 
IS could only be done by someone culturally alien.  
 For illustration, when Annika was talking to a new member over coffee at the party 
office, she said: “What you should distinguish between when talking about immigration is the 
Western one and the non-Western one. Russians, for instance, have more or less the same 
attitude to most things… it’s still easy to come to Sweden, like, you’re polite, you don’t steal.” 
She contrasted this with “countries with sharia laws, it’s a big difference there… it’s not 
humane, cutting off people’s hands or stoning them, women can’t drive… coming to Sweden, 
then, is a really big change.”  
Recall also Johan’s comment above about how immigrants need to be taught that “you 
can’t beat your kids” and so on. Both he and Annika talked about culture, and the process 
whereby people from “different cultures” are excluded is distinctly ethnic in character; “they” 
are believed to be different, and these differences are made socially relevant. This, as Eriksen 
reminds us, is a key feature of the study of ethnicity, which “in social anthropology… simply 
refers to aspects of relationships between groups which consider themselves, and are regarded 
by others, as being culturally distinctive” (2010, 5).  
Moreover, both Johan and Annika insisted on the foreignness of behaviour and norms in 
“non-Western [immigration]”. A link was thus forged between cultural and geographical 
alienness, in addition to cultural traits being generalised to apply to entire categories of people. 
For example, talking about a new political party geared towards issues facing immigrants, 
called Nyans, Mats attempted to be nuanced. “Not all Muslims vote for Nyans, they’re not a 
homogenous group”, he said, but shortly after, he asserted: “you don’t become like us just 
because you cross a threshold [i.e., border].”  
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The examples that Johan and Annika brought up also pointed to particular differences; 
“they” are what “we” are not, and vice versa. Such stereotypes are typical of ethnic boundary-
making where ethnic groups, in a Barthian sense, are defined and indeed created in relation to 
each other (Eriksen 2010). Two ethnographic vignettes may briefly illustrate this point:  
 
Annika and I are in the spare room in City Hall chatting. She tells me she doesn’t think 
veils should be allowed in health care, mostly because of hygienic reasons, but adds: “It 
doesn’t matter how much they say they want it, because how do you know if they want to 
or if they’re just brainwashed?”  
 She’s also sceptical towards minarets. Church bells are just sounds, she says, but with 
minarets “there’s someone shouting that God is great, there’s only one God, bow down to 
God.” She shrugs and says that just doesn’t fit in with Christian and Swedish values.  
 
We have been handing out fliers, and even though it went faster than expected we are all 
cold and tired so we go to a nearby café to seek shelter from the biting February cold. I 
end up next to Gunilla and Emil and when there is a lull in the conversation and the 
opportunity presents itself I ask what is typically Swedish. They ponder the question for a 
while and reply “freedom of speech and gender equality.” They remember how former 
Social Democratic party leader Mona Sahlin said that Sweden doesn’t have any culture, or 
former Conservative PM Fredrik Reinfeldt who said that the only Swedish thing is 
barbarism. They’re really annoyed and shake their heads in disgust. I ask if meatballs and 
Midsummer are typically Swedish. They hum and shrug and say “yeah, I guess” but 
quickly return to freedom of speech and gender equality.  
 
The two excerpts are, in a sense, mirror images of each other. Annika’s belief that Muslim 
women could well be brainwashed into wanting to wear a veil is mirrored in Gunilla’s and 
Emil’s assertion that gender equality is a typically Swedish characteristic. Similarly, Annika’s 
misgivings about what she sees as the submissive attitudes in the minaret’s call is mirrored in 
Gunilla’s and Emil’s celebration of freedom of speech. “They”, in this case unspecified 
“Muslims”, embody the opposite of “our”, that is “Swedish”, values.  
Fredrik Barth’s theory about ethnic boundary making helps us make sense of this. 
Barth’s novel idea was that ethnic groups come into being, not through the “cultural stuff” that 
“makes up” an identity, but through contact with other groups. Ethnic groups become defined 
in opposition to each other. Without other groups with which to compare themselves, group 
formation becomes impossible, like “one hand clapping”, in Eriksen’s (2010, 14) poignant 
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words. Eriksen, drawing on Barth, describes the tendency of groups to hold stereotypes about 
other groups and draw attention to (alleged) cultural traits that become socially important as 
markers of difference. He emphasises that “group identities must always be defined in relation 
to what they are not” (ibid).  
These culturally alien Others, as described by my interlocutors above, are thus 
constructed as a group that is fundamentally different from “us”, and so does not belong to the 
nation – at least not the way “Swedes” do. Effectively, then, culturally and ethnically alien 
Others are excluded from belonging to the nation and thus from deserving welfare on par with 
native “Swedes”. In sum, having established that “they” do not belong, the justification is laid 
for welfare chauvinist policies. This, I would argue, is emblematic of exclusionary nationalism, 
to which I now turn.  
 
Exclusionary nationalism and empty and floating signifiers  
Ethnic boundary-making processes, clearly visible in my interlocutors’ discussions of national 
belonging, underpin their welfare chauvinist policies. It remains to clarify why these sentiments 
are expressed in particularly nationalist terms, and why the nation is, as I suggest, an empty 
signifier in the SD’s chain of equivalence.  
 First, as Eriksen argues, what distinguishes nations from other ethnic groups is their 
relationship to the state (2010, 125). This becomes evident in my interlocutors’ insistence on 
welfare chauvinist policies, which are per definition intimately tied to the state. Second, my 
interlocutors describe themselves as nationalists, and, relatedly, their welfare chauvinism aims 
to defend the nation and its resources from undeserving, almost exclusively foreign, threats. 
The belonging which majority ethnicity confers is thus both national and exclusive in character.  
 Furthermore, I suggest that these ideas as part of a worldview permeate, as well as 
constitute, all other demands. Take something so far removed – seemingly having nothing to 
do with immigration – as whether or not to sell off municipally owned properties, a question 
which arose some months into my fieldwork. This became a window that allowed me to catch 
a glimpse of how active SD members and representatives saw the state. Classically a Left-
Right political question, my interlocutors were at first unsure what to think. Thomas apparently 
said flat-out “no” to selling any properties, but Mats and Hampus wanted to look into it. Mats 
was reluctant to sell any properties with a classical-historical value, or any that brought in 
revenue.  
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 Thomas’s reluctance to sell anything and the particularities of what properties Mats 
wanted to sell are both illustrative of the Left-Right alignment, but also of tensions within the 
party. From what I could understand, Thomas and a few others tended to fall more to the 
traditional economic Left and Mats and like-minded others to the Right. They both agreed, 
however, that classical-historical sites should not be sold but safe-guarded under municipal 
ownership to ensure the buildings’ longevity. They would on several occasions praise the 
beautiful architecture of 19th century architecture as great feats of Swedish art. There was, in 
other words, a common clear nationalist, romanticising streak in their argument to not sell off 
such properties. Immediately, we see how the reasoning revolved around their idea of the 
nation.  
There is, however, yet another layer. While Thomas seemed to prefer state intervention 
and a regulated market, Mats was usually more liberal. Both leanings, however, reflected an 
exclusionary nationalist logic. For Thomas and those like-minded, a strong state would protect 
the national majority from harmful, external threats, such as resource-draining immigrants and 
foreign, encroaching businesses. During a different conversation, Alexander shrugged and 
said: “That’s what capitalism is, some win, some lose.” An indication of Alexander’s 
economically leftist leanings, listeners laughed and told him to: “Stop being a sosse [slang for 
Social Democrat]!”.  
The liberal camp, however, reasoned that the key to making life better for people was 
to create more jobs, so it should be made easier for companies to hire workers by, among other 
things, lowering the payroll tax. This also meant a smaller, less interventionist state, and, 
naturally, lower benefits. The implication was that everybody should take care of themselves, 
and if one could not, it was one’s own fault and one did not deserve help. This quite obviously 
excluded immigrants who did not know the language, and had no money or papers, from being 
considered deserving of help; they were just a drain on the inefficient welfare-state. Both 
Thomas’s and Mats’s approaches were, in other words, based on an exclusionary nationalist 
logic – for Thomas, the state was a bulwark against foreign (economic) threats, for Mats, the 
market would eliminate the same threats. For both, the common underlying goal was to protect 
the nation and its resources.  
In essence, then, as bluntly put by Hampus: “The immigration question affects every 
other question”. The exclusionary nationalist logic permeates even questions so seemingly far 
removed as whether or not to sell off local municipal properties. This is precisely the role of 
the empty signifier in Laclau’s chain of equivalence.  
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As we recall from chapter 1, an empty signifier is effectively deprived of any a priori 
meaning – the link between signifier and signified is severed, and requires radical investment 
to be filled with meaning. An empty signifier comes to represent “the people” as a totality, 
even though it is not, since there must be a constitutive outside of which to make demands.  
A floating signifier, on the other hand, has some reference to a signified (Moraes 2014) 
but is the site of contestation where competing projects try to fix its meaning (Laclau 2005, 
131) and it can be part of various and competing projects simultaneously. As Laclau himself 
points out, however, the empty and floating dimensions often overlap and the distinction is 
primarily analytical (2005, 133).  
I would argue that there is such competition between different political actors in 
Sweden as to what the nation means. All agree that it is a geographically and politically 
bounded entity, but there is a hegemonic struggle concerning what that means in practice, 
hence, more in the order of a floating than an empty signifier. Mainstream political parties 
pursue more inclusive (civic) visions of the nation than the SD, whose nationalism, as we have 
seen, is of the more excluding kind. I suggest, then, that “the nation” is a symbol around which 
the SD crystallises its identity, as well as constituting it. The nation, I argue, acts as an empty 
signifier for the SD, but as a floating signifier in society at large. As shown in the examples 
above, almost every political stance they take seems to come back to this nationalist vision. 
The SD, as “the people”, tries to fix the meaning of the nation, which binds together the chain 
of equivalence which also constitutes them as “the people”. Other demands, for instance 
concerns about security and crime or religion, are subsumed under the nationalist umbrella and 
take on a decidedly nationalist character. The SD considers crime to be a primarily “imported 
problem”, committed mostly by immigrants, who are discursively produced as threats to the 
nation. Leftist parties, on the other hand, have traditionally (in Sweden, at least) viewed crime 
as more determined by socio-economic factors.  
  A few concluding words may be said about the relationship between nationalism and 
populism. It has been noted (see Anastasiou 2019) that populist movements are often 
nationalist, and nationalist movements are often populist. This is not a given since, as Laclau 
points out, any political group may employ a populist logic. However, the extent to which 
nationalist and populist movements converge is notable. Michaelangelo Anastasiou (2019) 
suggests that “under particular historical conditions of possibility, nationalism and populism 
may come to co-constitute one another” (2019, 331). He notes that as populism in scholarly 
work is often viewed through a European lens, with focus on radical Right-wing parties, 
populism is commonly “reduced to what is conceived to be its universal characteristic, or its 
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essence: nationalism” (Anastasiou 2019, 333). However, he argues that populism and 
nationalism differ in their discursive architecture: populism is structured around an intra-
communal “up/down”-axis, distinguishing between “the people” and “the elite”. Nationalism, 
on the other hand, is structured around an “in/out”-axis, separating nationals from non-
nationals. Populism is thus structured around the signifier “the people”, and nationalism around 
“the nation” (Anastasiou 2019, 334). This is primarily an analytical distinction, because 
Anastasiou then suggests that in practice, effective populist nationalisms establish a 
metaphorical likeness between the two. In other words, “the nation” and “the people” function 
as metaphorical replacements for each other – the nation “is” the people, and vice versa. Indeed, 
they come to co-constitute one another as internal and external enemies are symbolically 
associated with each other: “For example, the ‘threat’ of the immigrant (external enemy) cannot 
acquire political efficacy without reference to the immigration policies of the European Union 
(external enemy), which are endorsed by the national political establishment (internal enemy), 
for the benefit of ‘the elite’ (internal enemy)” (Anastasiou 2019, 340). Moreover, Anastasiou 
suggests, populism exists in an already existing hegemonic nationalist landscape. Even 
political projects that promote inclusivity and discourage nationalism thus cannot avoid making 
references to “the nation” (Anastasiou 2019, 338).  
Following Anastasiou, we could postulate that the SD is primarily a nationalist 
movement, as their demands are aggregated under the empty signifier “the nation”. However, 
as he points out, in actual practice nationalism and populism co-constitute each other. 
Consequently, the link between nationalism and populism is established.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have outlined some anthropological ideas about how the idea of the nation 
came into being and dominant strands in scholarly work concerning nationalism. We have seen 
how the SD’s welfare chauvinism is intimately tied to ideas about the state, the nation, culture, 
and ethnicity. In essence, my interlocutors hold that welfare should be received based on 
national belonging, which in turn is based primarily on conforming to “Swedish norms”. I have 
tried to show how “the nation” operates as an empty signifier through examining how 
essentially all demands, heterogenous as they are, are subsumed under a nationalist umbrella, 
which also in turn shapes the SD’s demands. Finally, I considered how nationalism and 
populism co-constitute one another through establishing a symbolic equivalence between “the 
nation” and “the people”.  
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 Nations do not, however, exist in a vacuum, but are a part of an increasingly globalised, 
neoliberal world characterised by transnational flows of capital, ideas, and people. In the next 
chapter, I therefore turn to an exploration of the SD’s entanglements with neoliberalism and 
globalisation.   
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Chapter 4  




We’re in a large room in City Hall and Mats has just finished presenting the SD’s budget 
suggestion for the municipality for the coming year to two journalists. Annika is fiddling 
with the camera she used to film the presentation, Gunilla, Johan, Thomas and Hampus 
are chatting nearby, and Mats is talking to the journalists while they are packing up and 
preparing to leave.  
 “Unofficially”, Mats says, almost conspiratorially, to them, “I can say that if we were in 
a conservative coalition, we’d be the guarantee that they didn’t stray too far to the right, 
we care about the welfare. And the same if we’d work with the Social Democrats [S]; I 
wouldn’t mind, we’re closer to S than the Centre Party or the Liberals here in the city… 
but we’re the guarantee in Swedish politics that no-one goes too far to the left or the right.”  
 
Ideologically, the SD is usually labelled “far-right” or “extreme right” (Widfeldt 2015). How 
come, then, that Mats does not want to “stray too far to the right”, or that he feels they are 
“closer to S than the Centre Party or the Liberals”? What is the “right” in “far-right” (Joppke 
2021b)?  
 In previous chapters, we have examined various aspects of the SD’s particular brand of 
populism. I have suggested that “the nation” as an empty signifier crystallises the party’s 
identity – however, it is still unclear where the SD fits in on the classical political left-right 
continuum. In this final chapter, I will broaden my focus to consider how the SD interacts with 
global neoliberal ideas. In order to lay the analytical foundation for this chapter, I will start by 
briefly reviewing anthropological approaches to neoliberalism. This will be followed by an 
examination of the SD’s entanglements with the political Right, neoliberalism and 
globalisation, and “responsibilization” of individuals. I will then turn to an investigation of 
different immigration logics, how my interlocutors relate to neoliberalism, and their views on 
the matter. Finally, I will contextualise my study in a comparative discussion about neoliberal 
nationalism in Hungary. It will be argued that my interlocutors’ relationship to neoliberalism 
is complex and fraught with tensions as they both embrace and oppose various aspects of 
neoliberalism. For instance, I will suggest that the SD’s welfare chauvinism may be considered 
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as underpinned by a neoliberal logic, while their insistence on ethnopluralism may be 
understood as nationalist.  
 
What is neoliberalism? 
In an overview of anthropological approaches to neoliberalism, Matheiu Hilgers (2010) points 
out that there is no universally accepted definition of the term “neoliberalism”. However, 
anthropologists  
 
apply the term to a radicalised form of capitalism, based on deregulation and the restriction 
of state intervention, and characterised by an opposition to collectivism, a new role for the 
state, an extreme emphasis on individual responsibility, flexibility, a belief that growth 
leads to development, and a promotion of freedom as a means to self-realisation that 
disregards any questioning of the economic and social conditions that make such freedom 
possible. (2010, 352)  
 
Hilgers furthermore teases out three main approaches to the study of neoliberalism: cultural, 
systemic, and an approach through governmentality. I draw on all three in this thesis, with an 
emphasis on the approach through governmentality.  
 First, a cultural approach is concerned with how wealth is created almost by magic, and 
links the local (through ethnography) to the global. Hilgers suggests that on a global level, “the 
transnationalisation of production and capital reproduces and transforms divisions that were 
formerly internal to states”, which impedes any shared sense of belonging (Hilgers 2010, 355). 
This transnationalisation also makes it difficult to negotiate working conditions, as ties binding 
enterprises to nation-states are increasingly eroded. Culture-based approaches are useful and 
precise when examining local and specific groups, but become more general and less effective 
when they understand and study culture in a broader sense. Second, the systemic approach is 
more oriented towards functionalism, and focuses on how a system endures in a state of 
equilibrium. It considers how neoliberalism tends to expand and elevate the penal sector of 
societies, “so that the state can silence the reverberations caused by the diffusion of social 
insecurity at lower levels of the hierarchy of class and ethnicity, and appease popular discontent 
generated by the withering of its traditional economic and social functions” (Wacquant in 
Hilgers 2010, 356). But to consider neoliberalism as the project of a few omniscient elites to 
dismantle the working class flirts with conspiracy theories and is too simplified, according to 
Hilgers. Moreover, he suggests that neoliberalism is a transnational project that originated in 
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the US, but “has adopted mental categories and dispositions that are not entirely within its 
control” (2010, 357), meaning it is both intentional and uncontrolled. However, in line with 
established critiques of functionalism, Hilgers argues that a systemic approach does not fully 
account for resistance and inconsistencies. Finally, the approach through governmentality 
obviously relies on a Foucauldian conception of power and self-disciplining. It “leads subjects 
to perform actions that reinforce their own subjection” (Hilgers 2010, 358). The self is 
understood and developed as an enterprise, and managed “in accordance with the logic of the 
market” (ibid). Following a logic of competition, certain sections of the population – the 
uncompetitive, such as the poor, refugees, certain workers – are as a rule understood as 
individual failures, whereas the competitive elite receives help and state sanctions. I will 
elaborate on this below.  
Nonetheless, as neoliberalism, in its market-oriented obsession, generally calls for as 
small a state apparatus as possible (and one whose goal is to optimise capital accumulation), 
how can we understand not only the continuation, but the flourishing of nation-states? With 
this brief overview of neoliberalism in mind, I will in the following explore some aspects of 
the relationship between neoliberalism and nationalism.  
 
The neoliberalism-nationalism nexus 
The SD, like all of us, exists in a neoliberal, globalised world with unprecedented flows of 
ideas, capital, and to an extent, people. They are also, as we have seen in previous chapters, 
strongly nationalist. However, it is common to claim that (neo)liberalism and nationalism are 
anathema to each other (Schiering 2021) although, as we shall see, it is much more complex 
than that. At the same time, nationalist movements have been gaining momentum and influence 
(Thorleifsson 2019a).  
 One clue to how the SD understands the relationship between neoliberalism and 
nationalism might be found in a comment by one of my interlocutors. “Rather Orbán than 
Macron”, Gunilla grimaced over lunch one day, having just read a newspaper article about the 
French president. “He [Macron] is a globalist. That’s scary.”  
 Sociologist Christian Joppke suggests that neoliberalism entails an unprecedented 
“opening” of the world with these increased flows, that, is, globalisation (2021b). In reaction 
to this opening force, a closing force responds, namely nationalism. This “open/close” 
dichotomy is, he argues, one of the most salient dividing lines of politics in our time. As 
demands for “opening” increase, so do calls for “closing”. Gunilla thus preferred the, in her 
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mind, nationalist Orbán over what she perceived as the neoliberal Macron. The distinction 
between the two politicians is, however, far less clear-cut. Orbán’s platform embraces certain 
neoliberal policies, too, and Macron’s nationalist, but Gunilla seemed to respond to the 
globalist versus the nationalist aspects.  
 Interestingly, however, as we saw in the previous chapter, my interlocutors also 
defended what one might, following Joppke, call “earned citizenship”. Immigrants are 
welcome, they said, if they work and become productive members of the nation and are not a 
burden on society. In Joppke’s view, earned citizenship is a neoliberal nationalist sentiment. 
To untangle this, we must take a closer look at Joppke’s conceptualisation of neoliberalism.  
 He suggests that liberalism and neoliberalism share the exaltation of the individual as 
the foundation of society. They part ways, however, in their ideas of social justice: liberalism 
tolerates difference as long as it is for the benefit of those worst off in a given society, whereas 
neoliberalism does not. For neoliberalism, the market trumps everything, which entails a 
radical “responsibilization” of individuals – “injustice is exclusively an attribute of the 
individual and her intentional action”, Joppke writes (2021b, 6-7). “Accordingly, poverty and 
deprivation, insofar as they are the unintended outcome of aggregate market behavior, cannot 
be subject to justice considerations – they are ‘evils’ but not ‘injustices’”. Joppke further points 
out that “personal responsibility” is “a core tenet” of liberalism, too (2021b, 17), but it is its 
“punitive and society-exculpating” aspects in neoliberalism that are novel. Society is not 
responsible for individuals, they are, and the poor are often punished for their own misfortune, 
which is seen as individual failure.  
 Earned citizenship is thus neoliberal as it entails “responsibilitized” individuals with an 
emphasis on work and productivity, according to Joppke. It is also nationalist because in 
viewing citizenship as a privilege rather than a right, it is “reserved for the select few who 
thereby upgrade the value of the national community that they join” (Joppke 2021a, 9). At the 
same time, curiously, “citizenship seems to have lost its nationalist edges” (Joppke 2021b, 
158). Liberal and human rights discourses have facilitated access to citizenship and rights have 
become “less exclusively attached to citizenship” (Joppke 2021b, 159), and rely more on long-
term residence. This analysis was made by Joppke in the early years of the new millennium, 
and he has since revised his argument somewhat. In the last decade, Joppke argues, in a reactive 
fashion, citizenship under neoliberalism has instead become harder to attain, at least for 
“undesired” immigrants (2021b, 159). Long-term residence and time passing (“naturalisation”) 
is, under neoliberalism, not the first, but the last step of successful integration and earning 
citizenship. This is generally true for the least competitive immigrants, the un- or low-skilled, 
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but less so for the high-skilled (Joppke 2021b). In making citizenship harder to attain, 
nationalism, as pointed out above, is also prominent. Competitiveness and “responsibilization”, 
coupled with the increasing exclusiveness of national citizenship, engender a neoliberal 
nationalism.  
 As much as they welcome productive immigrants, the nationalist SD is nonetheless, I 
would argue, ethnopluralist (Joppke 2021b): they hold that all cultures are equally valuable, 
but should exist and develop separately. This could be evinced by a statement made by Mats 
when we were in his office doing an unstructured interview one day. I had asked about 
something completely different, but as often happened, he soon found a way to start talking 
about immigration and integration. He said that he wants to defend cultural diversity: “It’d be 
stupid boring [aptråkigt] if, in a hundred years, everyone was exactly the same all over the 
world!”, he exclaimed. He said he liked that there are different cultures, but he seemed to think 
and dislike that cultures would become increasingly homogenous if migration and globalisation 
continue on their current trajectories.  
 Similarly, Johanna, the leader of Centreville’s SD youth chapter, fiercely defended 
cultural distinctiveness. She and Annika were visiting City Hall one afternoon to record a 
podcast with Mats. The airline company SAS had released a commercial the day before, which 
said that more or less everything we consider “typically Scandinavian” has been imported at 
some point from other parts of the world. My interlocutors were furious about the commercial 
and Twitter had been blowing up all morning. “They’re spitting on Swedish culture”, Johanna 
said indignantly. “I feel offended… but I’m probably not allowed to say that.”  
 Her visceral reaction hints at the affective dimension of nationalism and the pride she 
took in Swedish cultural distinctiveness. Seen in light of Mats’s assertion that cultures should 
not be the same everywhere, Johanna’s comment could be understood as a similar position. 
Integration, so the argument goes, is the responsibility of the arriving migrant to adapt to the 
host society, in order to retain the host society’s culture without it being muddled, polluted, or 
distorted too much by other cultural practices or values.  
Mats, indeed, put this quite explicitly. As usual in his office, during an unstructured 
interview, I had asked whether he was afraid of losing “Swedish culture”. He thought for a 
second, and said that in his view, what is generally meant by integration is actually assimilation. 
“Integration means adapting to each other, but if people come here they should try to become 
Swedish”, he concluded.  
A civic, liberal nationalism might frown at this. From such a perspective, it should not 
matter where a person comes from or what culture they adhere to since through naturalisation 
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a person would become a citizen regardless. From a purely neoliberal standpoint, it would not 
matter, either, as long as the prospective citizen could earn their keep. A neoliberal nationalism 
discriminates not on the basis of categorical exclusions like culture, gender, or religion, but on 
individual grounds or “in consideration of what the individual does, not what she is” (Joppke 
2021a, 10). Mats’s and Johanna’s comments, then, in their concern with culture, have some 
unmistakably ethnopluralist and nationalist overtones, which we touched upon in the previous 
chapter.  
Having considered some entanglements of neoliberalism and nationalism, I now turn 
to a deeper exploration of the SD’s ideological landscape.  
 
Left, right, and centre   
 
We are having lunch at “the Greek” in a busy food court, laughing and reminiscing about 
youthful escapades. Unprompted, Mats suddenly complains that “It’s a pity there isn’t a 
proper right-wing party, economically right-wing. I mean, M [the Moderates] and S [the 
Social Democrats], it’s the same thing, a percentage here and a karensdag4 there. People 
should get to do whatever they want with their money and the state should be there as a 
guarantee.” He wistfully recalls how neighbours used to help each other out, much more 
than is the case today. Civil society should take care of people, he argues, and when that 
fails, that’s when the state should come in.  
 
Compare this statement, calling for “a proper right-wing party”, with the first in this chapter, 
where Mats said that the SD is “the guarantee in Swedish politics that no-one goes too far to 
the left or the right”, and that they “care about the welfare”. How can these two statements be 
reconciled?  
 Obviously, an individual’s views are not necessarily always entirely congruent with the 
party’s. Considering that the SD is so often labelled “radical right”, however, it merits closer 
inspection.  
 My interlocutors came from many different political backgrounds. Some were, before 
they were SD party members or politicians, members of the Moderates, some the Social 
Democrats, and some were not politically affiliated at all. One member, who used to be a 
 
4 A karensdag means that the first day of a worker’s sick leave is not paid by their employer. Following days are 
reimbursed by 80% of one’s regular salary. The concept has been debated for a long time – leftist parties want 
to abolish it, and rightist coalitions want to keep it.  
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member of the social democratic youth chapter, poignantly said: “It’s S that’s left the working 
class, not the working class that’s left S. We have the same opinions we’ve always had.”  
 Mats’s and the previous S member’s comments both point to a fascinating turn in post-
Cold War politics, examined by Joppke. He argues that radical right policies have turned from 
neoliberalism towards welfare chauvinism. Starting from the very inception of the political 
terms “left” and “right”, Joppke explains that following the French revolution, traditionalist 
supporters of the monarchy sat to the right of the assembly’s president, and progressive 
Republicans to his left. This spatial metaphor came to represent politics in general in the West, 
as the “right” stood for order and conservation and became associated with the defence of 
private property, and “left” stood for change and movement and became associated with 
redistributive economics. The “right”, according to Joppke, is thus inegalitarian, and the “left” 
egalitarian (2021b, 45).  
 Curiously, this alignment of the “left” and “right” has changed in certain respects. 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, party politics has become more centralised in the 
middle (Joppke 2021b, 25) – like Mats said, “M and S, it’s the same thing”. This phenomenon 
coincided, Joppke argues, with the trend among leftist parties to turn more to a “third way”, 
attempting to clothe social democratic politics in neoliberal garb, thus, he argues, hollowing 
out the egalitarian impact of redistributive policies. Notably, it was under Democratic President 
Bill Clinton that the World Trade Organization (WTO) was founded, leading the way to 
“hyperglobalization”. Clinton also, just like he had promised, “end[ed] welfare as we know it” 
(Joppke 2021b, 26). In Germany, it was the Social Democrats who attempted “add on” 
neoliberal policies to the existing classic leftist agenda. Between 2003 and 2005, the Social 
Democratic chancellor reformed the labour market, “thus allowing the ‘glittery express train’ 
of neoliberalism to enter town and mess with one of the Continent’s oldest and most protective 
welfare systems” (Joppke 2021b, 28).  
In Joppke’s view, this “third way” left a vacuum on the political fringes, which radical 
right parties were quick to exploit. Thus “…’populist radical right parties’ mostly shed the 
‘neoliberal’ positions they might have once held in favor of ‘welfare chauvinism’, thus in effect 
becoming the new working-class parties” (Joppke 2021b, 46). The “‘neoliberal’ positions” in 
question are not named explicitly, but could be implicitly understood as, for instance, frugal 
positions on social policies, e.g., welfare and benefits.  
 Joppke’s account, while illuminating and useful, could for our purposes benefit from 
some anthropological nuancing. Is it true that the “right” as a whole “is” inegalitarian, and the 
left egalitarian? And has the “right” turned completely away from neoliberalism in favour of 
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welfare chauvinism? The answer to both these questions is surely a tentative “no”. There are 
numerous variations and mutations of neoliberalism which play out in various ways, depending 
on local, historical, and cultural contexts. Neoliberalism is highly flexible and adaptable 
(Schiering 2021), a point I return to below.  
What, then, is the “right” in “radical right”? Joppke suggests that it is the inegalitarian 
aspects still at work in these parties’ welfare chauvinism. As we saw in the previous chapter, 
welfare is awarded on a citizenship basis, which in turn is based partly on ethnic, exclusionary 
nationalist principles.  
It is interesting to note that a common complaint among my interlocutors was the notion 
that other political parties “stole” their motions. Often, it was explained to me, when the SD 
put forward a motion in the Municipal Board or Council, it was voted down, but then, leading 
up to the next meeting, an almost identical motion was put forward by another party, maybe 
with a word or a number changed. This complaint was usually followed by frustrated sighs and 
they would shake their heads. “It’s just because we’re SD”, they would say. “There’s nothing 
wrong with our ideas, they [other parties] just don’t want to be associated with us.”  
This phenomenon suggests an appropriation by other parties of the SD’s policies, which 
is noteworthy, since the SD has for several years been treated as a political pariah. The cordon 
sanitaire has, however, been severely weakened since the 2018 election, as noted in chapter 1. 
Naturally, it must be assumed that whether or not a motion is “stolen” depends at least in part 
on the motion in question, and there is bound to be some overlap between parties regarding 
certain issues. Mats also recognised this: “I’ve learned that it’s always been like this”, he told 
me. “Even before we got in [to municipal government], M and S stole each other’s ideas all 
the time. You shouldn’t play the victim too much.” Again, the dynamic that Mats sketches out, 
the fact that parties have “always” stolen each other’s motions, points to a convergence in the 
political middle – like he said, “M and S, it’s the same thing”.  
 Of course, the relevance and use of the “left-right”-continuum at all is a question in and 
of itself. I will not delve too deeply into it here as it is beyond the scope of this thesis, but it is 
worth noting that the SD themselves refer to their ideological platform as “social conservatism” 
with “a nationalist basic outlook” (grundsyn) (Aspling 2019). My interlocutors rarely spoke of 
themselves in terms of “left” or “right”, but often referred to other parties in such terms. The 
continuum is thus clearly relevant for any analysis as it influences real-world positioning. The 
SD’s reluctance to place themselves firmly anywhere on the spectrum is nonetheless of interest. 
How, then, do they see themselves in relation to other parties, and the political landscape in 
general? And, as a corollary, how do they relate to neoliberalism, “the common denominator 
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in the production of inequalities in our contemporary societies” (Hilgers 2010, 360)? Below, I 
will consider these questions by examining my interlocutors’ entanglements with neoliberalism 
and nationalism.  
 
Populism, neoliberalism, and democracy  
Gunilla and I were having lunch on the balcony in City Hall one September afternoon, lapping 
up the late-summer sun. Looking out on the city skyline, Gunilla started talking about a 
construction project taking place in the city of which she was critical. She thought that it was 
being unethically funded with congestion charge revenue, and people in the city had voted 
against such a tax but it had been implemented anyway. Visibly annoyed, she said that the city 
was bad at listening to the people, but she proudly proclaimed that “that’s what we [the SD] 
want to do”.  
In previous chapters we have looked at the SD’s populist logic. Laclau has argued that 
populism is an inherent part of politics and, indeed, democracy (2005, 176). This is because 
democracy requires a “people”, which in turn is constructed through chains of equivalences 
(see chapter 1). This can be seen in my interlocutors’ frequent invocations of “listening to the 
people”, like the one above. In this sense, the SD’s populism is at first glance the opposite of 
neoliberalist, since neoliberalism, according to Joppke, is essentially opposed to democracy, as 
neoliberalism views democracy as a threat to the market regime (2021b, 11). This is, he argues, 
because neoliberalism generally favours governance by technocrats and experts, rather than 
elected democratic representatives. The democratic process, from a neoliberal perspective, may 
hamper the accumulation of profit. The SD representatives and members I studied, on the other 
hand, were adamant about the value of democracy, understood as “the people’s rule”.  
In addition, in a neoliberal age, power has increasingly shifted from states to 
corporations. Looking closer, however, my interlocutors showed certain neoliberal impulses. 
For example, Annika once compared the SD to the Nordic Resistance Movement (Nordiska 
Motståndsrörelsen, NMR). We were lounging and chatting in her room at the party office, and 
I had just said that I initially had wanted to study the NMR but decided against it. Annika 
thought the group was mad: “They’re… poop!”, she chuckled. Furthermore, she said that they 
are very left-leaning: “As long as you have a homogenous population, they want ‘everything 
for everyone’.” The SD is more right-wing, she mused, since “we are more open to a liberal 
economic politics”. Additionally, as the conversation quite naturally turned to the job market, 
she argued that the payroll tax should be cut for employers, making it cheaper to hire workers. 
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She meant that this was better for workers, too, because jobs would become more plentiful and 
easier to access, which in her view was key to a good life. That would mean that power would 
shift even more from workers and the state to corporations, as it would remove income, and 
thus influence from the state and signal that corporations hold the key to a better life. In a sense, 
this could be interpreted as a symbolic shift away from a populist idea of democracy (as in “the 
people’s” rule), since corporations are democratically unaccountable.  
My interlocutors are quite clearly populist nationalist, but also, as we have just seen, 
with certain neoliberal tendencies. If neoliberalism and populism are anathema to each other, 
as conventional approaches would have it (see Schiering 2021), how can this ideological 
conundrum be understood?  
Gabór Schiering (2021) suggests that neoliberalism and populism are not necessarily 
opposing forces, but can co-exist and even depend upon one another. Joppke obviously 
recognises this, too, in his conception of “neoliberal nationalism”, but Schiering nuances and 
elaborates this argument. He points to how, for example, many Brexit-supporters in the UK 
wished to protect the neoliberal state from EU-regulations, rather than oppose it. He argues 
that nationalist populism is sometimes used as a legitimation strategy – it “appeals to a mass 
public using a Manichean logic that opposes the virtuous people to corrupt elites and affiliated 
out-groups” (2021). Neoliberal actors thus rely on (national) populism to mobilise sections of 
the population that might not gain from globalist, transnational neoliberalism. Crucially, 
Schiering argues, the balance of power must be taken into account in considering how populism 
as legitimation strategy is used. So, for instance, neoliberal hegemony is challenged during 
economic crises, such as in Hungary in the 2000’s. When that happens, neoliberalism must 
adapt. In Hungary, nationalist forces were strong enough to challenge neoliberalism but not 
overthrow it entirely, which led to a compromise between transnational capital and national 
capitalists, which still retained core aspects of neoliberalism.  
But there is still some tension, populism and neoliberalism are indeed opposed in 
certain respects. The core of neoliberalism is capital accumulation, irrespective of states, 
culture, or mobility – as long as something is profitable, little else matters. Nationalism, on the 
other hand, is intimately tied to a state and is inherently exclusive as it depends on boundaries 
to other nations. This tension between populism and neoliberalism is indicative of what Joppke 
(2021b) has called “compensatory” and “constitutive” logics. Both logics are concerned with 
how state nationalism interacts with neoliberalism. In a “compensatory” logic, the state 
attempts to compensate for its loss of autonomy in a neoliberal, globalised world, where 
corporations and transnational actors are increasingly gaining power and influence. In a 
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spectacular fashion, states perform sovereignty by reinforcing borders and building walls. In a 
“constitutive” logic, on the other hand, states incorporate neoliberal ideas which may, as we 
have just seen, even be constitutive of nationalism as such. Joppke shows this co-constitution 
of neoliberalism and nationalism in the “responsibilization” of individuals. By not being a 
burden on the collectivity, in this case “the nation”, individuals feel an obligation to the nation. 
This amounts to nationalism, that is, a neoliberal nationalism (2021b, 61).   
The SD’s populist nationalist tendencies could be attributed to a “compensatory” logic, 
in that they call for reinforcing national borders and symbolically walling off the nation, in 
opposition to the globalising “opening” force of neoliberalism. On the other hand, they also 
apply a “constitutive” logic, visible in particular through the responsbilising “earned 
citizenship”.  
This tension between the “compensatory” and “constitutive” logics is, I suggest, at the 
core of my interlocutors’ politics. They appeal to voters who are “the prospective losers [of 
globalisation] of  tomorrow” with their welfare chauvinism, while appealing to the neoliberal 
elites at the top through facilitating certain transnational flows (of people, ideas, and capital), 
but not others. Joppke, again, sheds light on this, by exploring the “centaur state”.  
 
“Courting the top and fending off the bottom” 
In previous chapters, we have seen the ethnopluralist and welfare chauvinist logics at work in 
SD’s rhetoric about immigration. What we have not yet examined is the fact that there are 
different kinds of immigrations going on, notably high- versus low-skilled immigration. 
Generally, as will be shown below, high-skilled immigration was encouraged, but low-skilled 
was discouraged. Following Joppke, I suggest that this followed, at least in part, a neoliberal 
logic of “responsibilization”.  
Drawing on Wacquant’s sketch of a “centaur state” (referencing the half-horse, half-man 
creature in Greek mythology), Joppke describes a neoliberal state which is “…exclusive and 
nationalist at the bottom, yes, but inclusive and cosmopolitan at the top, obsessed with rooting 
out inequality, alas, not of the economic, but of the ethnic, racial or sexual kinds” (2021a, 7). 
He does not specify if this “rooting out” takes place at “the top” or “the bottom”, but it seems 
plausible to assume that in terms of culture and identity, it takes place in both, since little else 
than profit presumably matters in a neoliberal worldview.  
This distinction between high- versus low-skilled migration logics becomes clear in the 
issue closest to the SD’s heart: immigration. I noticed this during an Open House in the SD’s 
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party office. About twenty people had come. The air was damp from people’s wet umbrellas 
and raincoats, but the mood was relaxed and friendly, people were sipping coffee, nibbling on 
pastries and listening to Annika who was standing in the front of the room, talking about an 
upcoming motion in the Municipal Council. Annika said the model for resource distribution 
must be remade. “If you have an American engineer in your district, you don’t need more 
money for that”, she said. She referred to the fact that (from what I understood) the current 
model distributes funds (welfare and benefits) based on numbers of immigrants in any given 
city district, and a highly educated “American engineer” would not need welfare the way an 
unskilled immigrant might.  
An “American engineer” is not only culturally “Western” as opposed to “Muslim”, but 
also, crucially, high-skilled. Annika seemed to believe that such an immigrant would not 
require welfare (“you don’t need more money for that”) and would consequently not be a 
burden on society; they would not need, for instance, unemployment or housing benefits. 
However, my interlocutors did not seem to think this was the type of immigration that was 
most common (which, it might be noted, is true (Joppke 2021b, 173)).  
This was brought home to me when Jens at one point joked about high-skilled 
immigration. He was wrapping up a lecture one September evening for party members 
interested in becoming politicians. People were shuffling about, getting ready to leave, and 
Jens was encouraging people to come back and bring their friends. He said: “Bring people [to 
these lectures], we need more…” He chuckled. “…doctors, engineers, the kind of people who 
usually come [to Sweden].” People laughed. I understood it as a sarcastic reference to a pro-
immigration argument, commonly heard from government representatives, about how Sweden 
needs immigration; “we need doctors and engineers and they should be welcomed”, so the 
argument goes. The sarcastic tone of Jens’s comment, which warranted the laughs, suggested 
that my interlocutors did not believe that was the kind of high-skilled immigration that was 
most common.  
Notably, different valuations of high- versus low-skilled labour were not exclusively 
applied to immigrants, but my interlocutors also observed it along class dimensions. During an 
Open House in the SD’s party office, I was having coffee with some elderly members around 
the small kitchen table, waiting for the event to begin. They politely asked about how my 
research was progressing and I mentioned something in passing about my Norwegian 
university. One member laughed loudly and joked that I should seek asylum in Norway. “There 
is no salvation for this country!” he said, teeth flashing in an ironic grin. “Academics and 
intellectuals have an international market to move around in, but regular workers here are 
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screwed [körda].” The others laughed grimly and nodded their agreement. Not only low-skilled 
immigrants, but also “regular [Swedish] workers” were thus thought to be undesired – 
“screwed” – by the neoliberal system, but elites (“academics and intellectuals”) were believed 
to prosper under it. Following a neoliberal logic, ethnic low-skilled Swedes, as well as 
immigrants, seemed to be considered undesirable by this man since they were unproductive. 
However, as we have seen, the SD generally defended the Swedish ethnic majority on the basis 
of their national belonging, as opposed to immigrants. It seems that this member did, too, 
lamenting the lack of opportunities for “regular workers”. His comment pointed to a perception 
that the neoliberal system (in contrast to the SD) did not discriminate based on ethnic or 
national belonging, but rather class and productivity.  
Shedding light on this theme, Hilgers states that under neoliberalism “[s]ome categories 
of human beings are excluded from citizenship (refugees, illegal migrants, some workers) 
while others, by contrast, are first class citizens” (2010, 359). “The elite” thus reaps benefits 
and receives state subventions (such as tax breaks and facilitated paths into citizenship) while 
the poor are penalised. For instance, he writes that the transnational mobility of domestic 
workers in Asia is encouraged, but they live under awful conditions and are stripped of many 
of their rights. Such workers are generally perceived as “dangerous and undesirable” but are, 
in fact, “indispensable to the functioning of cities with the ambition to become geographical 
hubs of world capitalism” (Hilgers 2010, 359).  
 Furthermore, Joppke summarises the difference in approach to high- versus low-skilled 
immigrants in the phrase “courting the top, fending off the bottom” (2021b), which follows the 
logic of the “centaur state”. “The top”, that is the high-skilled, market-savvy, cosmopolitan 
elite, is not only allowed entry into the country, but actively sought-after. In stark contrast, low- 
or unskilled immigrants, predominantly subsumed under “family immigration”, are considered 
a burden and are “fended off”. This may well be true in European and Western countries, but 
as Hilgers showed, not necessarily everywhere – in the Asian cities he referred to, low-skilled 
immigrants were indeed sought after, though treated as second-grade inhabitants.  
This low-skilled immigration was nonetheless the type of immigration the SD was 
primarily concerned with and tried to stave off. My interlocutors were remarkably silent on 
high-skilled immigration, but often talked about welfare-draining (low- or unskilled) 
immigration. So far in this thesis we have focused on the chauvinist and ethnic implications in 
their arguments, but, as Joppke points out: “…if ‘immigrants’ are resented for not 
‘contributing’ and being a cost factor for society… one might as well qualify the underlying 
reasoning as ‘neoliberal’” (2021b, 102). In other words, my interlocutors’ resistance to 
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immigration could be understood as a neoliberally inspired resistance to unproductive cost 
factors, i.e., “immigrants”. The logic applied to “the bottom” can thus be neoliberal, too, but a 
peculiarly neoliberal nationalism, as opposed to the “open”, cosmopolitan neoliberalism at “the 
top”.   
 Yet, considering another statement by Mats which we examined in the previous chapter 
- “An Iraqi with a web company who just talks to other Iraqis and makes money, that’s great, 
having a job and not being a weight on society, but it’s not integration” – it becomes clear that 
the neoliberal perspective is insufficient to understand his view of immigration. However, we 
have considered the cultural and ethnic implications quite extensively already in precious 
chapters.  
 Nevertheless, can “the top” not be nationalist, too? Is the “elite” always cosmopolitan? 
Surely things are not quite that black and white. As noted above, Schiering (2021) points out 
that the balance of power in a given society must be taken into account. He suggests, as we 
recall, that nationalist capitalists can co-exist comfortably with transnational capital, as long as 
core aspects of neoliberalism are retained. Nonetheless, note that the elite adapts to nationalist 
forces, indicating that neoliberal nationalism becomes profitable, but was not initially. Perhaps, 
then, there is indeed some truth to Joppke’s analysis, but it might profit from being tempered 
with more ethnographic data. For instance, by looking at how the SD representatives and 
members I studied relate to neoliberalism and nationalism in practice, it becomes clear that 
these concepts are not static and fixed, but flexible, and the ways they are entangled are 
informed by historical, cultural, and economic circumstances.  
 Summing up my argument so far, I have tried to show how my interlocutors’ 
relationship to neoliberalism is complex and fraught with tensions. Their resistance to 
immigration, which is a core tenet of their political platform, relies in part on a neoliberal logic. 
Welfare chauvinism, the idea that immigrants in particular are a burden on society, could be 
understood partly as a neoliberal notion. However, their nationalist foundation also resists the 
“openness” of neoliberal globalisation, promoting strong borders and sovereignty.  
 In order to explore my argument from a different perspective, I will in this final section 
juxtapose the SD with the Hungarian right. Hungary, with its strong nationalist right-wing 
presence, is a particularly revealing field with which to compare the SD. The two countries 
differ greatly in history, geography, and culture, but as we shall see, there are some striking 
similarities as well.  
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Hung(a)ry for more 
Continuing with our theme of neoliberalism and immigration, let us consider anthropologist 
Chris Hann’s (2016) effort to understand Hungarian right-wing resistance to migration. He 
approaches this theme by looking at the region’s history. Under socialism, during Hann’s 
fieldwork in the 1970’s, before the collapse of the Soviet Union, people in the part of Hungary 
that he studied were fairly well off. Socialist, loosely organised farms yielded large profits, but 
at the cost of fulfilling private lives – people rarely had time for anything other than farm work 
(Hann 2016, 607). Yet, during the economic boom of the 1970’s, social inequalities increased. 
Despite increasing affluence and personal consumption, people generally attributed their 
successes to their own hard work, and resented the socialist principles and bureaucracies.  
 With the fall of the Soviet Union, the 1990’s saw privatisation of collective farms, 
which wreaked havoc for the agrarian labour sector. While Hann’s farmers were relatively 
spared from the most catastrophic effects, compared to other regions in Hungary, 
unemployment rose and many chose to migrate to Western Europe in search of work. Where 
people were generally future-oriented in their household accumulation strategies in the past, 
“most rural residents have few such options available to them nowadays” (Hann 2016, 603). 
Hann argues that they thus become “susceptible to neo-nationalism, which builds on earlier 
forms of populism dating back to pre-socialist generations” (ibid). In light of the refugee crisis 
of 2015, Hann describes feelings of resentment; as they felt that their own country was 
struggling to help even its “own people”, as so many had to leave the country to find work, so 
how could it be expected to provide aid and refuge to migrants (2016, 612)? Hann suggests 
that even if it is easy to condemn Hungary for a “compassion deficit” – the complaint that the 
nation does “not understand what it means to belong to a solidary community such as the 
European Union” (2016, 613), three things must be kept in mind. First, most people outside 
the capital have never had the chance to meet foreigners. This may not excuse their aggressive 
anti-immigrant posturing, but “it is well established that fear and negative stereotypes are 
seldom broken down until there is more concrete interactions with the groups in question” 
(Hann 2016, 614). Second, poverty has undoubtedly increased in rural regions of Hungary. 
Third, as noted, the country exports large numbers of labourers. Taken together, Hann asks if 
it really is surprising that the sight of millions of migrants, crossing Hungary’s borders on their 
way to richer European countries and receiving the aid that the rural population has been 
denied, sparks anger and resentment.  
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 A somewhat similar logic is expressed among the SD. As we have seen, my 
interlocutors commonly bemoaned how undeserving immigrants were given plentiful benefits, 
while deserving “Swedes”, who had worked and thus contributed to society, struggled. 
Furthermore, recall Joppke’s assertion that the “third way” of many leftist political parties has 
left a vacuum which the Right has exploited in becoming the new working class parties (Joppke 
2021b, 46). It could be argued that, as one of my interlocutors put it, “It’s S that’s left the 
working class, not the working class that’s left S. We have the same opinions we’ve always 
had”,  suggesting that the SD – like the Social Democrats – reacts to neoliberalism, but the two 
parties do so in markedly different ways. The Social Democrats have arguably, at least to an 
extent, abandoned its concern for welfare, and increasingly embraced neoliberal austerity. The 
SD, on the other hand, have pressed for more welfare, but exclusively for the native population. 
Just as in Hann’s analysis, in other words, my interlocutors responded to neoliberalist policies 
and their perceived negative effects by turning to “the new working class parties” (Joppke 
2021b, 46). This appears to have been a recipe for success, just like Orbán’s rise to power and 
the popular support he enjoys. Hann’s interlocutors, however, turned against marginalisation 
rather than neoliberalism.  
 Furthermore, as this chapter has argued, my interlocutors employed neoliberal logics, 
too, for instance in their welfare chauvinism and different immigration logics. Although 
Sweden has not experienced the kind of economic crisis that Hungary did in the 2000’s, the 
financial crisis of 2008 had a profound and negative impact on the country’s economy, albeit 
not to the same extent as in Hungary. Nonetheless, I would suggest that the resentment that 
Hann describes also resonated with my interlocutors. It would be much too simplistic to suggest 
that financial hardship is directly responsible for the rise of the Right, of course, but as a factor 
I believe it cannot be overlooked. However, a complex process is clearly at work.  
 Considering the three aspects Hann asks us to keep in mind, further differences come 
to light. First, my interlocutors, in contrast to Hann’s informants, had ample opportunities to 
meet foreigners. Gunilla had lived abroad for some time, Annika told me she had worked with 
a number of “Somalis”, and there were several Centreville SD party members with an 
immigrant background. Nonetheless, most of my interlocutors still, as outlined in chapter 3, 
held many negative stereotypes about immigrants. Second, as far as increased poverty goes, 
this is trickier to assess. My interlocutors all lived in an urban area and their incomes varied 
significantly. Some members were unemployed, some on benefits, some had blue-collar jobs, 
others were rather well-off. It is thus difficult to gauge whether poverty among SD 
representatives or members as a whole has increased or been affected in any way in the last 
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decades, as it varies between them. Finally, Sweden has not exported labour even close to the 
extent that Hungary has. Nevertheless, as we have seen throughout this thesis, my interlocutors 
still felt that too much welfare was spent on immigrants, when they believed that it should go 
to the native population. It would seem, then, that the affective reactions were quite similar in 
some respects for Hann’s interlocutors and mine, despite some rather great differences in 
economic and social policies and circumstances.  
Don Kalb (2018), also analysing Hungary and examining “the rise of the Right”, sheds 
some more light on these issues by using Kaisa Ekholm Friedman’s and Jonathan Friedman’s 
idea of “double polarization” (Friedman in Kalb 2018). Cultural and social polarizations, they 
argue, operate in sync. The ”ethno-national folk” sees itself as opposed to a cosmopolitan ruling 
class which, they believe, does not care about the nation as such at all, but embraces all of 
humanity and the planet. Furthermore, the ”folk” is also positioned against a ”dangerous class”, 
made up of mostly immigrants and their children. Additionally, they believe that the 
cosmopolitan elite cares more about the “dangerous class” than its own people, as the elite 
embraces mobility, migration, and human rights and condemns the illiberal, prejudiced 
nationals (Kalb 2018, 306). Polarisation thus works on two fronts – the “ethno-national folk” 
is pitted against the cosmopolitan elite, on one hand, and a “dangerous class” on the other, 
while the elite and immigrants are believed to be in league with each other. This view nuances 
the, according to Kalb, simplistic idea that there is a cultural or an economic explanation for 
the rise of the Right (2018, 307).  
Again, we see some similarities with the SD. My interlocutors, as we have seen earlier 
in this chapter, opposed low- and unskilled immigration, following a neoliberal logic of 
individual “responsibilization” and productivity. At the same time, as discussed in chapter 2, 
my interlocutors believed that established political parties – which might be understood as “the 
elite” – did not understand the gravity of the national effects of immigration. The ruling centre-
leftist government was thought to naively embrace multiculturalism at the expense of the native 
population, just like in Kalb’s analysis.  
Furthermore, Kalb accentuates the illiberal elements of the Hungarian right. Liberalism 
as a political ideology, according to Kalb, increasingly lost its legitimacy around the turn of 
the millennium, in parallel with increasing poverty and unemployment, and accusations turned 
to immigrants and transnational influences. The Hungarian right tends to reject homosexuals, 
cultural Marxists and liberal elites (Kalb 2018, 308).  
Here, at least one important difference between the Hungarian right and the SD 
emerges. In contrast to this illiberal discourse in Hungary, the SD employs a distinctively 
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liberal rhetoric in embracing LGBTQ rights, gender equality, and freedom of speech. However, 
as noted in previous chapters, this rhetoric seems to be deployed usually in order to distinguish 
“Swedish values” in opposition to the purportedly oppressive Islam.  
Just like the populist right in Hungary, then, the SD responds to “threats” from above 
and below: the purported “dangerous class” (immigrants) from below, and transnational, 
cosmopolitan elites from above (the SD wants to strengthen “the nation”, opposing “EU 
federalism”). Nonetheless, they must also appeal to the “top” (elites) and the “bottom”. “The 
bottom” here would be represented by, for instance, domestic labourers, like Polish 
construction workers. The result is the neoliberal nationalism which we have explored above.  
This brief comparative discussion leaves us with the insight that despite greatly varying 
histories, geographies, and cultures, there are some striking similarities between the Hungarian 
right and the SD. Particularly the affective responses to neoliberal policy effects seem to be 
similar, albeit expressed in different ways.  
In this chapter we have seen that the SD’s relationship with neoliberalism is complex 
and multi-faceted, which I have tried to show in this chapter. Though neoliberalism and 
nationalism are often perceived as opposing forces in conventional approaches, 
anthropological studies as well as my own data show that it is far from that simple. A neoliberal 
logic appears to underpin immigration and citizenship practices and policies (in high- versus 
low-skilled immigration), just as nationalist populism seems to be a driving force behind 





In its most basic form, this thesis has attempted to understand the SD’s populist-nationalist 
logic and why my interlocutors believed and acted the way they did. I have done this by 
approaching my field primarily through Ernesto Laclau’s (2005) theory on populist reason, but 
in dialogue with other theories, such as Florian Mühlfried’s (2019) conceptualisation of 
mistrust and Joppke’s (2021b) theory concerning neoliberal nationalism. Chapter 1 sketched 
out a brief history of the SD, as well as Swedish political and administrative organisation, and 
a somewhat simplified outline of Laclau’s theory. I argued that the SD constitutes itself as “the 
people” through chains of equivalences. By constructing an internal antagonistic frontier 
against the ruling elite as well as mainstream media, the SD gained a sense of internal cohesion. 
This was further explored in chapter 2, where empirical data showed my interlocutors’ mistrust 
of state and municipal institutions, other political parties, and the media. I suggested that my 
interlocutors considered these actors biased and dishonest, partly grounded in their purported 
naivety, but also hunger for power, and that the further an actor was perceived to be from my 
interlocutors’ viewpoints, the less they could be trusted. I also discussed the ambiguity 
experienced by my interlocutors in the case of right-wing, “alternative” media, and the 
difficulty in gauging their trustworthiness. The content could to them seem reasonable, but the 
sources were deemed unacceptable by party leaders. I suggested that this could potentially be 
a strategy on the SD’s part: if it had been too clear what sources were and were not acceptable 
and thus trustworthy, some members might have felt excluded, but if it had been too vague, 
they might have lost their sense of belonging or purpose.  
Chapter 3 examined my interlocutors’ understanding of nationalism and “the nation”, 
and how it was in part informed by ethnic pluralism and boundary making. I argued that “the 
nation” as an empty signifier crystallised the SD’s identity while simultaneously shaping the 
party’s demands. “The nation” also acted as a floating signifier as its meaning was contested 
by other political actors as well. In chapter 4, nationalism was further explored through its 
entanglements with neoliberalism. I suggested that the SD’s relationship to neoliberalism is 
complex and fraught with tensions and they both embraced and contested various aspects of it. 
While welfare chauvinism could be understood as nationalist and ethnically exclusive, it could 
also be conceptualised as a neoliberal sentiment, as a neoliberal logic dictates individual 
responsibility and productivity.  
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The scope of this essay is limited, which is why some intriguing dimensions have by 
necessity been left unexplored. For instance, I have not examined in detail the SD’s demands 
for security, or how immigrants come to be associated with criminals. This call for increased 
security was a common one among my interlocutors, and further research could prove 
illuminating.  
 Additionally, the affective dimension, briefly touched upon here and there in this thesis, 
could have benefitted from a more thorough study and an analysis could have been explored 
in more detail.  
Furthermore, I was unable here to investigate questions of gender. The SD is a male-
dominated party, both in representatives and membership base (Mulinari and Neergaard 2014). 
There have been some studies on the topic (see Mulinari and Neergaard 2014), but these are 
mostly by scholars from other disciplines, particularly sociologists. Anthropologists, I believe, 
have an important contribution to make in studying the radical right. Our emic understanding, 
or view from within, is valuable and instructive in understanding these groups on their own 
terms, as opposed to etic studies carried out by, for instance, journalists, sociologists, or 
political scientists. Anthropological fieldwork and analyses may make it possible to build 
bridges between the seemingly widening chasms and increasing polarisation between political 
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